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That it is raining is a reason I have to bring my umbrella. But the reason for which I bring it
is that it complements my outfit. Fashion, rather than function, is my basis for bringing the
umbrella. This relation between an action or attitude and its basis is the basing relation. I
defend a novel account of the basing relation.
Chapter 1 focuses on a fundamental instance of basing: inference. I construe drawing a
conclusion from premises as in part being caused by (consideration of) those premises to draw
that conclusion. But one can be caused to believe a conclusion by some premises without
thereby inferring; one might associate from some beliefs to another, as in a daydream. I
invoke representational states to distinguish genuine inferences from mere associations.
More specifically, in representing the premises as supporting the conclusion, one is thereby
committed to that support relation obtaining. So drawing a conclusion has a distinctive
functional role, which I call the hereby-commit role. Inferring is akin to the agent’s thinking,
“I hereby commit to the premises’ supporting the conclusion.”
Chapter 2 broadens the Hereby-Commit Account from inference to all instances of basing.
A doing-caused-by-a-reason is an action done on the basis of that reason just in case, and
because, the doing plays the hereby-commit functional role. For instance, to bring the
umbrella on the basis of its complementing my outfit is to commit—in the very bringing—to
the umbrella’s complementing my outfit favoring bringing it. To act on the basis of a reason
is thus not merely to be buffeted about by causal forces, but to take a rational stand.
Chapter 3 introduces considerations about basing to a debate from which they have been
absent. Although the details are contested, it is widely accepted that logic is normative
iii
in some sense. However, discussion of logic’s normativity has been overly parochial. In
addition to the norms that have been suggested, we should consider basing norms. I argue
that countenancing basing norms defuses the most pressing challenge to logical pluralism,
the view that there is more than one correct logic.
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CHAPTER 1: INFERENTIAL BASING AND COMMITMENT
Introduction
Inference is rationally distinctive. Consider Hermione, who believes:
(1) Whatever Harry, a renowned gourmet, recommends is delicious.
(2) Harry recommends burritos.
From these premises Hermione infers:
(3) Burritos are delicious.
Contrast Hermione with Ron. Ron also believes (1) and (2), and makes a transition from
those beliefs to (3). However, Ron’s transition is not an inference. Perhaps considering (1)
and (2) reminds Ron that he’s supposed to meet Harry for lunch, which causes him to think
about the new burrito place that just opened, which has been running a successful advertising
campaign, which in turn causes Ron to believe that burritos are delicious.
Hermione’s transition can rationally justify her belief that burritos are delicious in a
way that Ron’s transition from (1) and (2) to (3) cannot justify his belief. Of course, Ron’s
belief that burritos are delicious could be justified in other ways. Perhaps he has a strong
body of inductive evidence furnished by the consumption of copious delicious burritos. But,
unlike Hermione’s transition from (1) and (2) to (3), Ron’s corresponding transition can do
nothing to bolster the rational status of his belief that burritos are delicious. The intuitive
explanation for this disparity is that Hermione’s transition is an inference, whereas Ron’s
transition is not. His transition is a mere mulling, musing, or other piece of mental jogging.1
When things go well, inference is a method of rational belief formation; mere mulling is not.
1I take the term “mental jogging” from Siegel (2017, 85), who adapts it from Broome (2013, 226–227).
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What is it about inference that explains its rational distinctiveness? According to the
Standard View, inference consists in two things.2 First, the inferrer represents the premises
as supporting the conclusion. Second, that representational state causes (in the right way)
the agent to believe the conclusion. So Hermione infers, whereas Ron does not, because only
she represents (1) and (2) as supporting (3), and only she is thereby moved to believe that
burritos are delicious. Hermione’s inferential transition is rationally distinctive because she is
moved to believe the conclusion by her positive appraisal of the support that the premises
provide for it. By contrast, Ron’s transition is a matter of mere causation and so cannot
rationally justify his belief in the same way.
In this paper, I develop an alternative to the Standard View. My account succeeds
where the Standard View stumbles: it explains the rational distinctiveness of inference while
avoiding the regress problem famously articulated by Lewis Carroll (1895). Roughly, the
representational state either plays the role of a premise in an inferential transition or not.
If so, a vicious regress ensues. If not, the challenge is to identify a nonpremise role for the
representational states involved in inferences. Proponents of the Standard View struggle to
do this satisfactorily.
Partly for its inability to deal with this regress problem, the Standard View has recently
come under heavy fire. Critics blame the Standard View’s failure on its commitment to
inference’s involving representational states.3 They are right to reject the Standard View,
but they misdiagnose its fundamental flaw. The deep problem with the Standard View,
and why it ultimately flounders in the face of Carroll’s regress, is not its commitment to
an inferrer’s representing the premises as supporting the conclusion. The Standard View’s
undoing is rather its insistence that the representational state is causally prior to believing
2Proponents of the Standard View include Thomson (1965), Bratman (1979), Wedgwood (2006),
and Boghossian (2014).
3See Dogramaci (2016), McHugh and Way (2017), Rosa (2017), and Siegel (2017). Broome (2014)
seems to offer a reduction of the relevant representational state to dispositions. But his discussion
of what he means by “support” makes clear that he has something other than Standard View in
mind.
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the conclusion. Jettisoning this assumption paves the way for a novel account of inference
that avoids Carroll’s regress, while retaining the intuitively compelling idea that the rational
distinctiveness of inference lies in the inferrer’s representing the premises as supporting the
conclusion.
On the Standard View, drawing a conclusion depends on a prior representational state.
On my alternative account, to draw a conclusion is to represent the premises as supporting
that conclusion. That representational state commits the inferrer to its content. So to infer
is—in the very drawing of the conclusion—to become committed to the support the premises
provide for the conclusion.
1.1 The Standard View
On the Standard View of inference, to infer consists in representing the premises as supporting
the conclusion, and to be moved to believe the conclusion by that representational state.
Following Boghossian (2014), call the relevant representational state a taking state. The
taking state registers the inferrer’s positive appraisal of the support that the premises provide
for the conclusion: she takes the premises to support the conclusion. An inferrer considers
p1 . . . pn and takes them to support q. This appraisal moves her to believe the conclusion
that q; thus she infers.
It is worth underscoring the Standard View’s appeal; not for nothing has it been the
dominant theory of inference. In particular, the Standard View promises to explain the
rational distinctiveness of inference—of why inferring can rationally justify in a way that
mere mental jogging cannot. The intuitive thought is that an inferrer, as opposed to a mental
jogger, traces a connection of rational support between the premises and the conclusion.4 The
inferrer’s tracing is manifest in her taking state, which represents the premises as supporting
conclusion. And that taking state is causally relevant in the agent’s coming to believe the
4We must understand the tracing nonfactively. The Standard View allows an agent to infer q from
p1 . . . pn even though the premises do not support the conclusion.
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conclusion. Thus, according to the Standard View, inferring is rationally distinctive because
it is driven by a state that is itself a manifestation of rational agency: positively appraising
the premises as supporting the conclusion.
There are different versions of the Standard View. But they all share a commitment to
two claims:
Taking (first pass). A transition is an inference in part because it involves a
corresponding taking state.
Priority. A corresponding taking state is causally prior to an inferential
transition.
Taking captures the thought that what’s rationally distinctive about inference is that it
involves the inferrer’s positively appraising the support that the premises provide for the
conclusion; this appraisal is encoded by a representation—a taking state. Priority captures
the thought that the taking state does its work by somehow causing the agent to come to
believe the conclusion. For reasons that we’ll get into in shortly, being moved to draw a
conclusion by a causally prior taking state is not sufficient for inferring. The taking state must
be causally relevant in the right way.5 Standard-View theorists cash this out in different ways.
Important here is not what’s different but what’s common to all versions of the Standard
View: an inferential transition partly consists in a corresponding taking state (Taking),
which is causally prior to the agent’s believing the conclusion (Priority).
Taking does not entail Priority. Taking seeks to explain the rational distinctiveness
of inference by appealing to a representational state; it is silent about the relative priority of
an inferential transition and its corresponding representational state. Hence one can endorse
Taking while denying Priority. Such a view holds that, while inferences involve taking
5The problem that the Standard View faces here is a version of the infamous problem of deviant
causal chains. For general discussion, see Davidson (1973), Peacocke (1979), Mitchell (1982), and
Smith (2012). For discussion in the context of inference, see Wedgwood (2006). The account of
inference I develop in this paper avoids the problem, but that is an issue for another occasion. See
the second paper of this dissertation: “Acting on the Basis of a Reason”.
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states, those states are not causally prior to inferential transitions.6 This is the view that I
will defend.
Before getting to my positive proposal, however, let’s improve on the first pass of the
claim about taking states:
Taking. S’s transition from believing p1 . . . pn to believing q is an inference
(whereby S draws the conclusion q from the premises p1 . . . pn) only if, and partly
because, the transition involves S’s having the corresponding taking state: S takes
p1 . . . pn to support q.7
Three elaborations are in order. First, I am helping myself to the idealizing assumption
that an inference is always from beliefs to a new belief. Strictly speaking, this is not correct.
For instance, as Harman (1986) points out, an inference can involve abandoning a belief,
instead of forming a new one. Moreover, I don’t want to exclude the possibility of inference
to and from nondoxastic states, or perhaps even directly to action. But, since it simplifies the
discussion considerably to focus exclusively on inferences to and from beliefs, I will idealize
away from other kinds of inference.
Second, Taking is only a necessary constraint on inference: the mere presence of a taking
state is not sufficient for inferring. For example, I might take the fact that it is my friend who
has been accused to support her innocence, but I conclude that she is innocent on the grounds
that she has an unassailable alibi. So the Standard View supplements Taking by claiming
that inferences involve taking states that move agents to draw conclusions. Developing the
details of this movement needn’t concern us here. However the intricacies are worked out, all
Standard-View theorists agree that a key part of the story is that taking states are causally
6Several other theorists have recently developed similar views (Neta 2013, 2019; Valaris 2014; Marcus
2020; Koziolek 2017; Hlobil 2019). Briefly considering these views will help bring mine into relief.
But that will have to wait until after my own view is on the table. See n. 31.
7Taking should be sharply distinguished from Boghossian’s (2014, 5) “Taking Condition”. Boghos-
sian defends a version of the Standard View: his Taking Condition entails both Taking and
Priority. For this reason, Taking is not subject to the criticisms that McHugh and Way (2016)
level against Boghossian’s Taking Condition.
5
relevant to an inferrer’s believing a conclusion. Hence the commitment to Priority: taking
states need to be prior to inferential transitions in order to give the latter the required causal
impetus.
Finally, some remarks on what a taking state is. This is a topic that deserves serious
further consideration elsewhere, but the following skeletal characterization will suffice for
our purposes. As I understand it, S’s taking state that p1 . . . pn support q is a committal,
obtaining representation of S’s that p1 . . . pn support q. A taking state’s being a committal
representation means that it generates a commitment to its content. When you take some
premises to support a conclusion, you are thereby committed to those premises supporting
that conclusion. In light of this you are subject to rational appraisal.8 So having a taking
state is one way of being committed to the premises’ supporting the conclusion. A taking
state’s being an obtaining representation means that it represents the support relation as
being the case or obtaining; contrast this with the representational content of a hope.
I assume nothing further here about taking states. In particular, I remain neutral on
whether they need be: conscious or not; conceptual or not; more belief-like than perception-
like; and so on. Moreover, while all taking states entail commitments, I do not insist on the
converse. Thus, even if they would eschew the “taking” terminology, any theorist who seeks
to explain the rational distinctiveness of inference in terms of a relevant representation should
accept this minimal characterization of taking states.
Proponents of the Standard View endorse not only Taking, but also the further Priority
claim. While this combination of commitments is integral to their efforts to explain the
rational distinctiveness of inference, it opens the door to Carroll’s (1895) regress.
8More on commitment in §1.4.
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1.2 Carroll’s Regress
Disclaimer. Carroll’s regress is notoriously hard to interpret.9 We needn’t get bogged down
here in whether my interpretation of the regress captures exactly what Carroll had in mind.10
The important point is the challenge the regress poses for the Standard View.
Consider the inference:
(A) All wizards like burritos.
(B) Severus is a wizard.
(Z) Severus likes burritos.
According to the Standard View, an agent infers (Z) from (A) and (B) only if this involves
her having a causally prior taking state. Otherwise, her premise-conclusion transition is not
an inference, but a mere mulling, musing, or mental jogging.11 The corresponding taking
state has the content:
(C) “All wizards like burritos” and “Severus is a wizard” support “Severus likes
burritos.”
What role does the taking state play in the inference? Here’s a tempting initial thought: the
taking state is an additional premise. The inferrer comes to believe that (Z) by inferring it
from (A) and (B) together with (C).
But this cannot be right, on pain of regress. If the taking state were another premise, we
would just have another inference:
9Moktefi and Abeles (2016) and Besson (2018) make the murky exegetical waters admirably clearer,
if not quite pellucid.
10Several distinct regresses can be extracted from Carroll’s text. For regresses similar to the one
here, see Stroud (1979) and Marcus (2020). For others, see Ryle (1946), Boghossian (2003, 2008),
and Besson (2018).
11Since inference is a piece of mentation and not a relation between abstract contents, “premise-
conclusion transition” is shorthand for “premise-beliefs-conclusion-belief transition”.
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(A) All wizards like burritos.
(B) Severus is a wizard.
(C) “All wizards like burritos” and “Severus is a wizard” support “Severus likes
burritos.”
(Z) Severus likes burritos.
But the question immediately arises once more: why is making a transition from (A), (B),
and (C) to (Z) inferring, rather than something else, like mental jogging? By Taking and
Priority, there must be a prior taking state for this further inference.12 But (C) is not
the corresponding taking state of this new inference from (A), (B) and (C) to (Z). This is
because (C) does not make reference to itself; it is just another premise.13 So we need a
further taking state:
(D) (A), (B), and (C) support (Z).
Now we’ve done it. All we’ve got is yet another inference:
(A) All wizards like burritos.
(B) Severus is a wizard.
(C) “All wizards like burritos” and “Severus is a wizard” support “Severus likes
burritos.”
(D) (A), (B), and (C) support (Z).
12Here and henceforth, I’ll sometimes drop the “causally” qualifier on “prior” to avoid tedium, but
it should be understood.
13Making (C) self-referential would not fix the deep problem. Since Taking is only a necessary
and not a sufficient condition on inference, the challenge still arises of distinguishing between
noninferential premise-conclusion transitions that happen to involve taking states, and genuine
inferences. More on this in §1.3.
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(Z) Severus likes burritos.
For similar reasons, this further inference will require its own prior taking state. And that
new taking state, if it is just another premise, will be part of a still further inference that
requires yet one more taking state, and so on.
Carroll’s regress shows that taking states cannot always function as premises in further
inferences.14 What I will call the Carrollian Challenge is to specify some other, nonpremise
role for taking states to play.
1.3 Three Problems for Standard-View Responses
Boghossian (2014) articulates the most developed version of the Standard View. He explicates
the role of taking states by appealing to rule following, where the latter notion is an
“unanalyzable primitive” (Boghossian 2014, 17). This avoids Carroll’s regress by stipulating
that taking states do not play the role of premises. They instead play some sort of guiding role
akin to a rule. Since taking states are not premises, Carroll’s regress of inferences and taking
states does not get going. However, while it avoids the letter of the regress, Boghossian’s
response faces three problems. As we’ll see, these problems are not unique to Boghossian’s
approach, but obstacles for any version of the Standard View to overcome.
First is the Etiology Problem. The problem is to give a story about how taking states
arise, a story which does not extricate us from the frying pan of Carroll’s regress only to
plunge us into the fire of a different regress. On pain of another regress, taking states cannot
always be the products of further inferential processes. Then an inference, I1, would require
a taking state τ1. But τ1 would be the result of another inference I2, which would require its
own taking state τ2. And so on. Hence we should avoid Carroll’s regress in a way that solves
the Etiology Problems. Trading one vicious regress for another is not much progress.
14I assume that this regress is vicious. For discussion of what makes a regress vicious, see Nolan
(2001), Cameron (2008), and Bliss (2013).
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Boghossian’s rule-following view gives no inkling of whence taking states arise, and so
does nothing to solve the Etiology Problem. Boghossian owes us an explanation of how taking
states are produced, yet none is forthcoming. My point is not that this explanatory burden
is insuperable.15 Rather, it is that the Etiology Problem needs solving for Boghossian’s
rule-following view to provide an adequate answer to the Carrollian Challenge. And this
remains to be done.
Second is the Explanation Problem. Boghossian’s view fails to shed much light on the
nature of inference. An account of rule following needs to solve the notoriously tricky problem
of discriminating between following a rule and merely according with a rule (Kripke 1982;
Boghossian 1989; Wright 1989; McDowell 1992). By helping himself to the notion of rule
following as a primitive, Boghossian avoids this issue by fiat. But it doesn’t illuminate
the nature of inference to assimilate it to an unexplained phenomenon that is at least as
mysterious.16 In particular, explaining taking states by way of a primitive notion of rule
following does little to further our understanding of inference beyond insisting that following
a rule (and hence inference) is rationally distinctive in a way that according with rule (and
hence mental jogging) is not.
Both the Etiology Problem and the Explanation Problem generalize beyond Boghossian’s
rule-following view. Any account of inference that appeals to taking states will need to give
a story about how they arise, a story that does not lead to another regress. Moreover, the
account should appeal to notions that afford a satisfying explanation. Even setting these
challenges aside, however, there is a third problem that any version of the Standard View
must grapple with.
15Wright (2014) argues that it is insuperable. He presents a dilemma for Boghossian’s view based on
a taking state having to have content that is either specific to its corresponding inference or not.
Either way, Wright argues, the taking state must have arisen by way of inference. Wright’s dilemma
is suggestive, but not decisive. It is in principle open to Boghossian to specify a noninferential
generative process, such as intuition, for some taking states. But Wright’s dilemma amplifies the
Etiology Problem: without a clear etiology, the threat of a new regress looms large.
16Hlobil (2014, 424–426) raises a similar complaint, in a slightly different context.
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The Rational Distinctiveness Problem stems from the fundamental structure of the
Standard View itself. We’ve gotten into the weeds of Carroll’s regress and how the Standard
View might avoid it by specifying a nonpremise role for taking states. But it’s worth stepping
back to remind ourselves why we ventured into the weeds in the first place. Our task is to
explain the rational distinctiveness of inference—to explain why inference can yield rational
beliefs in a way that mental jogging cannot. The Standard View does this by positing a
causally prior taking state: positively appraising the support that the premises provide for
the conclusion is part of what moves an agent to infer.
However, adding a taking state to the causal base of a premise-conclusion transition does
not do much to explain that transition’s rational distinctiveness. If being moved by premises
in the absence of a taking state is mere mental jogging—is just being buffeted about by the
causal winds—then why does adding another thing to the causal base turn mere mechanics
into a rational process?17 This question is especially pressing because including a taking state
in the causal base of a premise-conclusion transition is not sufficient for an agent’s inferring
that conclusion. Suppose Neville believes p1 . . . pn and he has a taking state with the content
that p1 . . . pn support q. His beliefs and his taking state jointly cause him to believe that q,
but this is not yet to say that he has inferred.18 Neville’s transition might be a mere causal
fluke, one that can confer no positive rational status on his belief that q.
The Rational Distinctiveness Problem raises a fundamental challenge: how can a causally
prior taking state possibly secure the rational distinctiveness of inference? The challenge is
sharpened by the fact that all parties agree that causally prior taking states are not sufficient
for inference.19 So if a causally prior taking state sometimes results in mere mechanics, what’s
17Korsgaard explores a general version of this question in much of her work. See, for instance,
Korsgaard (1999, 2009).
18A Standard-View theorist might construe the causal relevance of an inference’s corresponding
taking state in a variety of ways. A taking state’s jointly, along with the premises, causing belief
in the conclusion is just one of these ways, which is useful to focus on for expository purposes.
19This is in part due to the problem of deviant causal chains.
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special about those transitions in which it leads instead to inferring?
It’s worth highlighting that the difficulty here stems from the very structure of the
Standard View. In explaining the rational distinctiveness of inference, we are trying to
capture the idea that an inferrer, in drawing a conclusion, undertakes a rational process,
rather than being brutely moved by the premises. If we’re in the grip of the Standard View,
we might think that the only way to explain the rational distinctiveness of inference is to add
something that conspires with the premises to cause the inferrer to believe the conclusion.
But this invites the challenge just posed, of how adding anything to the causal base of
a premise-conclusion transition can transform it from a churning of the causal order into
ratiocination.
To sum up, the Standard View faces three obstacles in adequately avoiding Carroll’s
regress: the Etiology Problem, the Explanation Problem, and the Rational Distinctiveness
Problem.20 I do not claim that Standard-View theorists cannot overcome these obstacles. But
they are serious enough impediments to motivate exploring an alternative to the Standard
View itself.
1.4 An Alternative to the Standard View: Taking without Priority
Recall the Standard View’s two core commitments:
Taking. A transition is an inference in part because it involves a corresponding
taking state.21
Priority. A corresponding taking state is causally prior to an inferential
transition.
Given the Standard View’s struggle to avoid Carroll’s regress, several theorists have recently
20For similar concerns to the Explanation Problem and Rational Distinctiveness Problem, see
Marcus (2012) and Neta (2019).
21I use the first-pass version of Taking for readability, but the official construal is on p. 5.
12
rejected it (Wright 2014; Dogramaci 2016; Rosa 2017; Siegel 2017).22 They blame the
Standard View’s failure in part on Taking and so seek to give accounts of inference that do
not require an inferrer’s representing the premises as supporting the conclusion. I doubt that
the rational distinctiveness of inference can be adequately explained without appealing to
taking states. Some of these theorists are motivated nonetheless to try because they explicitly
take the Carrollian Challenge to tell decisively against the Standard View, and they implicitly
assume that the only way to reject the Standard View is to abandon Taking (Wright 2014,
32-33; Rosa 2017, §6).
But there is another way to reject the Standard View. I propose to explain the rational
distinctiveness of inference by appealing to taking states, but without insisting that those
taking states are causally prior to inferential transitions. In accepting Taking while denying
Priority, such an account promises to illuminate the rational distinctiveness of inference
without succumbing to Carroll’s regress.
Roughly, the account is this. An inference is a premise-conclusion transition that
constitutes its corresponding taking state. Recall that taking states are committal. So
when an agent infers q from p1 . . . pn, she thereby commits to p1 . . . pn supporting q. On the
Standard View, drawing a conclusion involves already taking the premises to support the
conclusion. On my view, by contrast, to draw a conclusion is to take the premises to support
the conclusion.
This needs unpacking. I’ll do so in three steps. First, in §1.4.1, I’ll operate at a high level
of abstraction and lay out the broad explanatory structure of my view. Second, in §1.4.2, I’ll
explicate my account by identifying a distinctive functional role for inference. That role is
akin to the inferrer’s thinking, “I hereby commit to the premises’ supporting the conclusion.”
Finally, in §1.4.3, I’ll explain how my account avoids Carroll’s regress without falling foul of
the Etiology Problem, the Explanation Problem, or the Rational Distinctiveness Problem.
22In addition to regress worries, some argue that the Standard View requires overintellectualizing
inference. See McHugh and Way (2016) for discussion.
13
1.4.1 Jettisoning the Priority Claim
What might a Taking-without-Priority account of inference look like? I hold that an
inferrer’s believing the premises causes her to believe the conclusion. So the transition from
premise-beliefs to conclusion-belief is a causal one. Of course, not just any causing of a
conclusion-belief by premise-beliefs is an inference; there can be mullings, musings, and so on.
According to my Taking-without-Priority account, an inferential transition between
premise-beliefs and a conclusion-belief involves a special kind of causal relation: the causal
transition from considering the premises to believing the conclusion constitutes the inferrer’s
having the corresponding taking state. Hence taking states play a role in explaining inferential
transitions, but not by moving agents to believe conclusions. Rather, the inferential nature
of the transition is characterized in part by something that the transition—when and only
when it is inferential—constitutes: a corresponding taking state.23
It’s worth dwelling on this explanatory structure. I characterize the nature of the
explanandum (an inferential transition) by appealing to something that the explanandum
constitutes (a taking state). Such an account illuminates the nature of the target phenomenon
by way of an asymmetrical dependence relation: constitution.24 My appeal to constitution
is somewhat unusual in that the direction of explanatory priority comes apart from the
direction of metaphysical priority. I characterize the nature of the explanandum by something
that it constitutes, rather than something it is constituted by. So taking states are at once
23One might wonder how a transition can constitute a state. I construe inference as a causal process
from (considering) premises to drawing a conclusion. Drawing a conclusion is an action and
actions can constitute states. (Some readers may prefer to construe an action as constituting
the onset of a state. Nothing here turns on this.) Under the right conditions, the action your
breaking the vase constitutes the state your being in deep trouble. Similarly, an inference is a
process-terminating-in-an-action that constitutes a taking state. The whole process, rather than
just the terminating action, constitutes the state to keep the connection between premises and
conclusion tight enough to preclude deviant causal chains (see “Acting on the Basis of a Reason”).
But there are variants of my view that just have drawing a conclusion (rather than the whole
transition) constituting a taking state.
24For more on constitution and similar notions, like grounding, see Fine (1994), Wilson (2014),
Glazier (2016), and Richardson (2018).
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explanatorily prior to inferential transitions (taking states characterize certain transitions as
inferential) and metaphysically posterior to them (taking states are constituted by inferential
transitions).
Two analogies will help illuminate my explanatory strategy. First, compare the question
of what it is to be a goalscoring kick in soccer.25 There are all sorts of kicks that are not
goalscoring kicks—passes, shots off target, and so on. What distinguishes goalscoring kicks
from other kinds of kicks? To answer that question we can appeal to two things: (i) a
causal process—from kicking the ball to the ball’s ending up somewhere; and (ii) something
constituted by the process—scoring a goal. Although there cannot be a goalscoring kick
without the scoring of a goal, they are not identical. There are other ways of scoring a goal,
for instance from a header.
We can similarly distinguish genuine inferences from noninferential premise-conclusion
transitions. We can do so by appealing to two things: (I) a causal process—from premise-
beliefs to coming to believe a conclusion; and (II) something constituted by the process—a
corresponding taking state. Although there cannot be an inference without a corresponding
taking state, they are not identical. There are other ways of taking some premises to support
a conclusion, for instance by judging, without inferring, that the premises support the
conclusion.26
This kind of explanation only seems to go so far, however. To give a more satisfying
characterization of an explanandum’s nature by appealing to something that it constitutes, we
must say something about the conditions under which the constitution occurs. For instance,
when does a kick constitute scoring a goal? Only when enough of the ball crosses the opposing
team’s goal line; only when the kicker’s team doesn’t commit a foul; and so on. It seems we
25The notion of a goalscoring kick is not useful enough to soccer fans to be something that anyone
keeps track of, unlike say, a shot on goal. But it is worth sacrificing soccer usefulness on the altar
of clarity in our pursuit of an account of inference.
26One crucial disanalogy between soccer and inference is that whether a kick is goalscoring or not
doesn’t seem to have much to do with the intrinsic nature of the kick itself. By contrast, whether
or not a premise-conclusion transition is inferential is intrinsic to the transition. See §1.4.2.
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could in principle specify necessary and sufficient conditions under which a kick constitutes
the scoring of a goal, and thereby fill out our explanation of what goalscoring kicks are. Do
we similarly need to fill out our explanation of inference?
I agree that more needs to be said about when premise-conclusion transitions constitute
taking states, and so when they are inferential. But I resist the idea that we can give an
illuminating account of inference only by specifying informative, independent necessary and
sufficient conditions for the constitution of taking states. That’s the where the second analogy
comes in. Compare what it is to promise. Promising is a causal process that ends with the
agent’s doing something, such as uttering the sentence “I promise to deliver the message.”
But not every utterance of “I promise to deliver the message” amounts to promising; one
might utter the words as part of a play. So what distinguishes the utterances of “I promise
to deliver the message” that amount to promises from those that do not?
Roughly, an agent’s uttering “I promise to deliver the message” amounts to promising
just in case, and because, it constitutes the agent’s being in a corresponding state: being
obligated to deliver the message. As in the case of soccer, we should say something about
when the utterance constitutes the obligation. But, unlike in the case of soccer, I’m skeptical
that we can give informative, independent necessary and sufficient conditions under which
an utterance constitutes an obligation. We could give conditions such as: the utterance is a
promise only when it is not given under duress; only when the utterer is not a participant in a
play; only when the utterer is not severely cognitively impaired; and so on. But I doubt these
conditions will be at once independent of promising and necessary and sufficient. That does
not render the account of promising useless, however. We can still gain significant insight
into the nature of promising by holding that promising is a causal process that constitutes
an obligation under some kinds of conditions and not others, even if we have no informative,
independent necessary and sufficient criteria.
I am not sure whether an inference is more like a goalscoring kick or a promise in this
16
respect. I won’t try to settle the issue here.27 But that doesn’t preclude us from giving an
illuminating account of inference by appealing to something that a causal premise-conclusion
constitutes just in case it is inferential: a corresponding taking state. For this account to be
illuminating, I’ll need to say more about the conditions under which a premise-conclusion
transition constitutes a corresponding taking state, and I’ll do so shortly. However, the bar is
set too high by insisting that informative, independent necessary and sufficient conditions
must be given before an account can do explanatory work.
The explanatory structure of my account is very different from the Standard View’s. For
Standard-View theorists, a corresponding taking state causally explains why the inferrer
comes to believe the conclusion. The taking state does this by moving the inferrer to draw
the conclusion. By contrast, I deny that corresponding taking states causally explain why
inferrers come to believe conclusions. The premise-beliefs alone cause an inferrer to believe a
conclusion; the corresponding taking state characterizes the premise-conclusion transition
as inferential, rather than not. It explains why she draws a conclusion, rather than merely
mulls her way into believing something that her premise-beliefs might happen to support.
That, then, is how one can endorse Taking without Priority. Inferences are partly
explained by corresponding taking states, but those states are not causally prior to inferential
transitions, as the the Standard View would have it. On my view, a corresponding taking
state does not cause an inferrer to believe a conclusion. A corresponding taking state is
instead constituted by all and only those premise-conclusion transitions that are inferential.
When does a premise-conclusion transition constitute a taking state? Just in case the
transition plays a distinctive functional role. Let me explain.
1.4.2 The Hereby-Commit Account of Inference
Recall the promising analogy. There are several ways you might promise to deliver the
message. You might, as we’ve seen, utter “I promise to deliver the message.” Or you might
27For relevant discussion see Lord and Sylvan (2019).
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give a solemn nod in response to being asked whether you promise to deliver the message.
Your uttering and your nodding both play the same functional role. In the very uttering of the
words or the nodding of your head, you thereby commit to delivering the message. It’s as if
you thought, “I hereby commit to delivering the message”, though no such thought—explicit
or otherwise—need accompany your utterance or your nod. Rather, the sentence picks out
the role that the very uttering or nodding itself plays.
Just as a nod can play the functional role of committing an agent through her nodding,
so too can a premise-conclusion transition play the functional role of committing an agent
through her making the transition. The notion of commitment has been underexplored, but
we can leave it intuitive here. When you are committed to something, you are on the hook for
it. You are subject to distinctive kinds of rational evaluation in virtue of that commitment.28
If you believe that all swans are white, you are committed to its being true that all swans are
white. In virtue of that, you are critizable for failing to give up your belief when confronted
with a black swan.
I maintain that a premise-conclusion transition constitutes a corresponding taking state,
and so is inferential, when and only when the transition plays the hereby-commit functional
role.29 It’s as if the inferrer thinks, “I hereby commit to the premises’ supporting the
conclusion.” But, just as one can commit to delivering a message simply by nodding, the
inferrer needn’t make any utterances or have any thoughts about commitment. Rather, the
premise-conclusion transition itself plays the hereby-commit functional role and constitutes
a corresponding taking state. In the very drawing of the conclusion, the inferrer takes a
rational stand and thereby commits to the premises’ supporting the conclusion.30
28For discussion, see Smith (2005), Hieronymi (2006, 2009), Boghossian (2008), and Neta (2019).
29One might wonder how a transition can play a functional role. I construe functional roles liberally
so that even transitions can have functional roles by having certain inputs or outputs: for inferential
transitions, the output of constituting a commitment to the premises’ supporting the conclusion.
But, if one prefers, one can think of drawing the conclusion itself as playing the functional role,
rather than the whole premise-conclusion transition.
30As I construe it, whether a premise-conclusion transition plays the hereby-commit functional role
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On this Taking-without-Priority account, inference is special in a way that mulling is
not, because inferring involves becoming committed—in the very drawing of the conclusion—to
the premises’ supporting the conclusion. That commitment makes an inferrer subject to
distinctive kinds of rational evaluation, to which she is not subject when she merely mulls.
Even though I might agree with you that pancakes are delectable, I can reasonably criticize
your drawing that conclusion from “Hagrid likes them” on the grounds that the premise
doesn’t support the conclusion; perhaps Hagrid has bad taste. And, in virtue of representing
it as being the case that “Hagrid likes them” supports “Pancakes are delectable”, you are
committed to the premise’s supporting the conclusion.
So to draw a conclusion is to commit, in the very transition from premises to conclusion, to
the premises’ supporting the conclusion. This commitment is generated by the corresponding
taking state that the transition constitutes—if and only if it is inferential. An inferential
transition from p1 . . . pn to q thus fulfils the hereby-commit functional role. The transition
functions as the inferrer’s thinking, “I hereby commit to p1 . . . pn’s supporting q.” That is
not to say that the inferrer need have a thought with anything like that form, consciously
or otherwise. Rather, drawing a conclusion, as opposed to merely making a transition to a
conclusion-belief, thereby commits the inferrer to the contents of the premise-beliefs—the very
ones from which she makes the transition—supporting the content of the conclusion-belief.
The hereby-commit functional role is thus fulfilled by the agent’s throwing her rational weight
behind the support the premises provide the conclusion. This is similar to how, when and
only when uttering “I promise to deliver the message” is promising, the uttering functions to
change normative reality by committing the agent to delivering the message (Austin 1962).
This yields the Hereby-Commit Account of inference. More precisely:
Hereby-Commit Account. An inference is a mental transition of S’s that
consists in: (i) believing p1 . . . pn—the premises; (ii) which causes S to believe
is due to the intrinsic nature of that transition. This is importantly different from whether a given
kick is a goalscoring one.
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q—the conclusion; (iii) that very causal transition constitutes S’s having the
corresponding taking state—taking p1 . . . pn to support q—thereby committing S
to the premises’ supporting the conclusion; (iv) the transition from premises to
conclusion plays the hereby-commit functional role, the role expressible by, but
not reducible to, S’s thinking, “I hereby commit to p1 . . . pn’s supporting q.”31
1.4.3 Avoiding Carroll’s Regress
Carroll’s regress shows that taking states cannot always be premises in further inferences.
The Carrollian Challenge, then, is to specify a nonpremise role for them to play. The
Hereby-Commit Account meets this challenge. An inference’s corresponding taking state
is not a premise. Rather, it is constituted by the causal transition from premise-beliefs to
conclusion-belief. The role it plays is that of characterizing the transition as inferential, rather
than mere mental jogging. Because an inferential transition constitutes its own corresponding
taking state, the regress of taking states and inferences never gets off the ground.
This solves the Etiology Problem, the burden of which is to explain whence taking states
arise. Recall from §1.3 that, on pain of another regress, taking states cannot always result
from further inferential processes. But, if they are not produced by further inferences, where
31It’s worth outlining how my account differs from other recent attempts to reject the Standard
View without abandoning Taking. Neta (2013, 2019) is neutral on whether taking states are
efficient causes of drawing conclusions, whereas I deny Priority outright. Moreover, the contents
of Neta’s taking states are very sophisticated. They are self-representing and depict relations of ex
post justification. These complicated representations are grist to the mill of those who complain
that Taking overintellectualizes inference (McHugh and Way 2016). My account relies on much
simpler taking states, which committally represent the premises as supporting the conclusion.
Valaris (2014) and Marcus (2020) argue that taking states constitute, rather than cause, inferences.
On my view, by contrast, taking states are constituted by inferential transitions. This allows my
account to avoid problems that Valaris and Marcus have with generalizing their accounts beyond
deduction. Koziolek’s (2017) disjunctive, knowledge-first account has taking states (rationally)
caused by inferential transitions, whereas on my view taking states are constituted by such
transitions. My account has two main advantages over Koziolek’s: mine is unified, rather than
disjunctive; and it avoids having to take knowledge as primitive. Finally, Hlobil (2019) rejects
Taking, arguing that takings are not states at all. Rather, he holds, to take some premises to
support a conclusion is to attach “inferential force” to the argument from those premises to that
conclusion. There are advantages to construing takings representationally, and Hlobil’s argument
against doing so is too quick). Moreover, despite Hlobil’s best efforts, the notion of attaching
inferential force remains somewhat obscure.
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do they come from? We shouldn’t leave the origins of taking states unsatisfactorily brute.
On my view, there is no mystery about the origin of an inference’s corresponding taking
state: it is constituted by the premise-conclusion transition. Since the taking state is not the
result of a further inference, we avoid Carroll’s regress without generating another one.
The Hereby-Commit Account also solves the Explanation Problem. The problem
is to specify a nonpremise role for taking states without appealing to inscrutable notions.
Boghossian’s rule-following approach runs into this problem. It avoids Carroll’s regress only
by appealing to rule following as a primitive. Of course, we have to have some primitives
to have any hope of theorizing. If we can manage it, however, it is better to do with fewer
primitives rather than more. My view shows that we can manage it. I avoid Carroll’s regress
by appealing to a causal transition from premises-beliefs to conclusion-belief and something
that the transition constitutes: a taking state. To be sure, causation and constitution are
notions that themselves need elucidating. But there is no reason to suppose that we will have
to resort to leaving them unexplained. How to construe causation and constitution are vexed
issues, but the present point only requires a not unreasonable hope that we have informative
things to say about them.32
The final problem that we must be wary of in steering clear of Carroll’s regress is the
Rational Distinctiveness Problem. In §1.3, I argued that the Standard View suffers from a
deep structural defect. It tries to explain the rational distinctiveness of inference by adding a
taking state to the causal base of believing a conclusion. But then Standard-View theorists
must explain what is special about being caused by taking states that leads to rational
distinctiveness, when being caused by one’s premise-beliefs alone is mere mechanics. This
explanatory burden is especially heavy, given that one can merely mentally jog even when a
taking state is causally relevant to so jogging.
32This point stands even if we ultimately cannot spell out what it is for a transition to play the
hereby-commit functional role in terms completely independent of inference. Of course, it’s open
to Boghossian to elucidate the notion of rule-following while leaving it unanalyzed, but that needs
to be done.
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The problem, I suggest, lies with the Standard View’s misguided allegiance to Priority.
This all but forces Standard-View theorists to tackle the Rational Distinctiveness Problem
etiologically: the rational distinctiveness of drawing a conclusion supposedly lies in how the
conclusion-belief is brought about. But that invites the worry that drawing a conclusion
is not rationally distinctive; it is just being buffeted about by especially complicated prior
causes.
In rejecting Priority, my Hereby-Commit Account offers a solution to the Rational
Distinctiveness Problem that does not depend on etiology. Instead of trying to secure the
rational distinctiveness of drawing a conclusion in its causes, the specialness of inference
lies in the way the conclusion is drawn.33 In particular, since an inferential transition plays
the hereby-commit functional role, to draw a conclusion is to take a rational stand. It is
to commit—in the very inferring—to the premises’ supporting the conclusion. Because the
commitment-generating taking state is constituted by the inferential transition, rather than
being prior to it, the taking state is not just another causal lever. The taking state instead
reflects the agent’s having made up her mind—in the very inferring—about whether the
premises support the conclusion. Borrowing some useful terminology from Hieronymi (2006,
2009), to draw the conclusion that q from p1 . . . pn involves settling the question of whether
p1 . . . pn support q. That opens you up to rational criticism because it reveals “the quality of
your will” (Hieronymi 2014, 15). Inference is thus rationally distinctive not because of its
causal history, but because only an inferential transition constitutes the agent’s endorsement
of the premises’ support for the conclusion. In the very act of drawing a conclusion, an
inferrer puts her rational seal of approval on the support relation between premises and
conclusion.
The Hereby-Commit Account thus delivers what the Standard View merely promised:
an explanation of the rational distinctiveness of inference that gives Carroll’s regress an
adequately wide berth. On the Standard View, drawing a conclusion involves being an-
33Neta (2013, 2019), Koziolek (2017), and Hlobil (2019) pursue similar strategies.
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tecedently committed to (or otherwise representing) the support relation between premises
and conclusion. The problem is that one’s commitments can cause one merely to mentally
jog to a conclusion-belief, and so it is difficult to distinguish mental jogging from genuine
inference. On my Hereby Commit Account, to draw a conclusion in part is to commit to
that support relation; an inferential transition functions as the inferrer’s thinking, “I hereby
commit to the premises’ supporting the conclusion.” Drawing a conclusion is thus rationally
distinctive not because of its etiology, whether that includes a taking state or not. Rather,
we exercise our rational powers in inferring by becoming committed—in our very moving
from premises to conclusion—to the premises’ supporting the conclusion.
1.5 An Objection and a Reply
Before I conclude, let me deal with an objection. Sometimes agents infer by explicitly
relying on a prior taking state. If giving up Priority requires denying what is obvious
by introspection, the objection goes, I can’t have explained the rational distinctiveness of
inference after all.
I concede the intuition: some inferences do involve prior taking states.34 But this poses
no threat to my view. Let’s distinguish a generic taking state from the corresponding taking
state of an inference. A generic taking state is any committal, obtaining representation with
the content that some premises support some conclusion. The corresponding taking state of
an inference from p1 . . . pn to q is the particular taking state that has the content that p1 . . . pn
support q. Taking is the claim that inferences are partly explained by corresponding taking
states. On my Hereby-Commit Account, that consists in the causal premise-conclusion
transition constituting the corresponding taking state.
34We should not overstate the force of the intuition, however. Compare action. While some
intentional actions involve prior intentions, others involve only intentions-in-action: the agent’s
intention is manifest through her acting, rather being prior to it (Anscombe 1963). Similarly, it’s
intuitively better to construe some inferences as involving only what we might call takings-in-action:
the agent’s taking is manifest through her drawing the conclusion.
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All of this is compatible with some inferences also involving prior, generic taking states
as premises. It is these cases that explain the datum of an inferrer’s sometimes relying on a





(6) p1 . . . pn support q
(7) q
The inferrer positively appraises the support that p1 . . . pn provide for q and then uses that
as a further premise to draw the conclusion that q.
But (6) is not the corresponding taking state of the inference. That way regress lies.
(6) is merely a generic taking state and does not explain why the transition is genuinely
inferential. What makes the transition from (4)–(6) to (7) inferential is that it constitutes a
corresponding taking state, which represents it as being the case that (4)–(6) support (7).
In this way, I account for the datum. Sometimes inferrers rely on prior taking states
when drawing conclusions. But when this happens, the prior taking state is a generic taking
state that functions as another premise, not the corresponding taking state of the inference.
The inferrer still needs to take a rational stand and commit to all the premises’ supporting
the conclusion; she does so by drawing the conclusion.
Conclusion
Why is inference rationally distinctive? The Standard View answers by appealing to taking
states that are causally prior to drawing conclusions. The commitment to both Taking
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and Priority means that the Standard View struggles to meet the Carrollian Challenge to
identify a nonpremise role for taking states. Moreover, I argued that the very structure of
the Standard View impedes its ability to explain the rational distinctiveness of inference. It
is far from clear that adding a taking state to the causal base of believing a conclusion can
turn mere mechanics into ratiocination. This Rational Distinctiveness Problem is especially
pressing, since even joint causation by premises and a corresponding taking state does not
suffice for inference.
The way to avoid these difficulties is not to give up on the idea that inference involves
representing the premises as supporting the conclusion. It is rather to accept Taking while
jettisoning Priority. Doing so allows for a new account of inference that explains its rational
distinctiveness while avoiding Carroll’s regress. On my Hereby-Commit Account, an
inference constitutes the inferrer’s taking the premises to support the conclusion. Since
this taking state is not prior to the inferential transition, Carroll’s regress never gets going.
Moreover, in virtue of having the corresponding taking state, the inferrer is committed to a
support relation between premises and conclusion. Inference is thus rationally distinctive
because inferring—as opposed to merely coming to have a conclusion-belief—has a distinctive
functional role. An inferential transition functions as the inferrer’s thinking, “I hereby commit
to the premises’s supporting the conclusion.”
Hence the rational distinctiveness of inference does not require a prior commitment to
the relevant support relation, as the Standard View claims. Rather, inference is rationally
distinctive because one commits to the support relation in the very drawing of the conclusion.
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CHAPTER 2: ACTING ON THE BASIS OF A REASON
Introduction
Suppose that a notorious miser donates millions to charity. She is aware that her donation
will greatly help many people. She is also aware that this fact is a reason for her to donate.
Nonetheless, the fact that her donation will greatly help many people is not a reason for
which the miser donates. The only reason for which she donates is that it will considerably
reduce her tax bill.
So not every reason an agent has for acting is a reason for which she acts. What is it,
then, for a reason to be one for which an agent acts? What is it, in other words, for an agent
to act on the basis of a reason? This paper answers that question.
Acting on the basis of a reason underpins an important kind of explanation, which we
can call “basing explanation”. When an agent acts on the basis of a reason, we can cite that
reason to make her action intelligible by her own lights. That is, by citing her basis we render
the agent’s action understandable from her point of view. The donor’s infamous meanness
makes her donation hard to understand at first. But, by citing the tax benefit, we show how
donating makes sense from the donor’s own miserly perspective.
Like most theorists, I construe basing as causing.1 When an agent acts on the basis of a
reason, the reason causes the action. Basing explanation is a kind of causal explanation. But
although all basing is causing, not all causing is basing. Some of the things an agent is caused
to do by reasons are not actions based on those reasons. For example: I’ve drafted a cutting
reply to an unwelcome email and the mouse cursor is hovering over the send button. Thinking
1I simply assume that basing is causing here, so what follows is an intramural debate among causal
theorists. Paul (2011), however, gives reason to think that issues similar to the ones I consider
here are relevant to noncausal theorists.
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about how satisfying it would be to send the email fills me with righteous excitement, causing
my finger to tremble and thereby click the mouse and send the email. That it would be
extremely satisfying to send the email is a reason that causes me to click the mouse. But
my clicking the mouse is not an action based on that reason: my clicking the mouse isn’t an
intentional action of mine at all, but rather a mere twitch or judder.
So causal theorists hold that basing is not just causing, but causing in the right way.
Everything turns, then, on what the right way is. Spelling this out informatively has come to
be known as the Problem of Deviant Causal Chains. A causal chain between a reason and
something an agent does is deviant just in case what the agent does is not based on that
reason. Hence, specifying the right way of causing (the way that yields basing) amounts to
ruling out deviant causal chains between actions and the reasons on which they are based.
The key to solving the Problem of Deviant Causal Chains, and thereby giving an
adequate causal account of basing, is to consider a different problem. Although this has
been underappreciated, the Problem of Deviant Causal Chains is closely tied to the Problem
of Rational Evaluability. When an agent acts on the basis of a reason, what she does can
evaluated as more or less rational. Not everything that we do is rationally evaluable, however.
Digesting is something that I do, but I cannot digest more or less rationally. The Problem
of Rational Evaluability is to explain what is special about basing such that it suffices for
rational evaluability, when many doings caused in other ways are not rationally evaluable.
Seeing what it takes to solve the Problem of Rational Evaluability helps us to articulate
the right way of a reason’s causing an action, the way that rules out deviant causal chains.
At a high level of abstraction, this involves two tasks. First, we identify whatever else
basing involves other than mere causation by a reason. Call that something more the “extra
feature” of basing.2 Considering the Problem of Rational Evaluability suggests that the extra
feature of basing must have important normative upshot. The difference between rationally
2Candidate extra features include: a desire to act in accordance with reasons (Velleman 1992);
a self-governing policy (Bratman 2001); counterfactual causal sensitivity (Peacocke 1979; Smith
2012).
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evaluable actions and mere operations is fundamentally a normative one. We need to appeal
to something normative to bridge the normative gap. Second, after identifying the extra
feature, we explain how it relates to the agent’s action. Perhaps, along with the reason,
the extra feature is causally relevant in bringing about the agent’s action (Velleman 1992;
Bratman 2001). Once again, reflecting on the Problem of Rational Evaluability is helpful.
To ensure the rational evaluability of an agent’s action based on a reason, the extra feature
must in some sense be in the agent’s very acting.
Hence the extra feature of basing must be normative and we must locate it in the agent’s
very acting. I spell this out by developing the Hereby-Commit Account, according to which
the extra feature of basing is what we might call “commitment”: an agent acts on the basis
of a reason only when the agent is committed to that reason’s favoring that action. And the
sense in which the commitment is in the agent’s very acting is that the causal chain from
her reason to her action constitutes the corresponding commitment. So the extra feature of
basing is a normative entity: a commitment. And a nondeviant causal chain relates to the
extra feature by constituting it.3 I elucidate the constitution relation functionally: acting
on the basis of a reason fulfills a distinctive functional role in an agent’s rational economy.
That role is expressible by, but not reducible to, the agent’s thinking “I hereby commit to the
reason’s favoring so acting.” In this way, to act on the basis of a reason is to take a rational
stand: it is to commit, in your very acting, to that reason’s favoring what it is that you do.
3In accepting the constitution of the extra feature by the causal chain, I reject a claim that is almost
universally, albeit implicitly, held by theorists of basing: that the extra feature is metaphysically
independent of what the agent does in acting on the basis of a reason. Those who are committed
to the metaphysical independence claim that I reject include: Davidson (1963), Frankfurt (1988),
Velleman (2000), Bratman (2001), Hyman (2015), and Mantel (2017). Neta (2019) is a possible
exception, although he is not officially a proponent of the Causal Theory. His view appeals
to formal causation, rather than efficient causation. Nonetheless, Neta’s view is compatible with
mine, and can be usefully seen as a complementary elucidation of the circumstances under which
the extra feature of basing is constituted.
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2.1 Two Problems for Causal Accounts of Basing
Three complications need dealing with before proceeding to the main argument in §2.1.1.
First, I’ve been using “action” broadly, but really I want to focus on a specific class of
actions. Set aside: unintentional actions; actions that are not rationally evaluable; whims
(Anscombe 1963, §17); and things based on reasons that are not naturally thought of as
actions, like beliefs and fears (Kelly 2002; Neta 2018). There are many interesting issues in this
vicinity, but they won’t concern us here. The class of rationally evaluable, intentional actions
that are based on reasons is large and important enough to be getting on with. Let’s regiment
some terms going forward. “Action” refers to a rationally evaluable, intentional action (like
giving money to charity), which may or may not be based on a reason.4 “Operation” picks
out anything else that an agent does. In particular, we’ll focus on operations that are not
attributable to an agent as an agent, like digestion: digesting is something that I do, but
it is not naturally construed as a manifestation of my agency. “Doing” is neutral term for
either an action or an operation.
Second, it is a matter of considerable controversy exactly what bases for action are (Smith
2003; Turri 2009; Alvarez 2010, 2018; Singh 2019). In particular, a debate rages as to whether
the reasons for which an agent acts are (facts about) mental states (like the miser’s belief
that donating will lower her tax bill) or (facts about) extra-mental entities (like that donating
will lower her tax bill). Although I remain neutral on these issues here, it will ease exposition
to pick a way of talking. So I assume that bases are facts about extra-mental entities.5
Third, it will streamline the discussion to suppose that an agent only ever acts on the
4On the present usage, although all actions based on reasons are rationally evaluable, there is room
for rationally evaluable actions that are not based on reasons.
5The debate about what bases are, which we’re setting aside, differs from the debate about what
acting on the basis of a reason is, which is our focus. Whatever bases turn out to be, there will
still be a question of how they relate to the actions that are based on them. Thus, we will still
need to theorize about basing even if it turns out that the debate about what bases themselves are
is irredeemably confused (Fogal 2018).
29
basis of a single reason. Of course, this isn’t correct. I might go to the store partly because
that is where I can get coffee, but partly also because it involves stretching my legs. My
account can be extended to handle such cases, but for the sake of smoother exposition, I’ll
speak as if basing always involves just one reason.
Having dealt with those complications, we can dive in.
2.1.1 The Problem of Deviant Causal Chains
The task is to give an account of acting on the basis of a reason. Our starting point is
that, whatever else it amounts to, basing involves causing (Davidson 1963; Peacocke 1979;
Smith 2012; Sylvan 2016). More precisely, letting “S” stand for an agent, “r” a candidate
reason, and “φ” a doing (that is, something S does, which is either an intentional, rationally
evaluable action or a mere operation):6
Causal Theory. S’s φ-ing on the basis of r consists in: r causes (in right way)
S’s φ-ing.
The Causal Theory is schematic, because it requires that r causes S’s φ-ing in the right
way, without saying what that amounts to. Different causal accounts spell this out in different
ways. I will do so in a new way in the remainder of the paper. To do so, I must solve the
Problem of Deviant Causal Chains (Davidson 1973; Peacocke 1979; Mitchell 1982; Velleman
1992; Smith 2012; Hyman 2015).
The problem arises because causation by a reason is only a necessary and not a sufficient
condition on basing. That is why we must spell out causation in the right way. A deviant
causal chain holds between a reason and a doing just in case that doing is not performed on
6r is a candidate reason in the sense that it is a consideration—a fact, we are assuming for the
present purposes—on which the agent’s action might be based. Thus r is candidate basis or
motivating reason for the agent’s action. I do not assume that r must be a normative reason for the
agent’s action. That is, r need not in fact count in favor of what the agent does. For readability,
I’ll sometimes drop the “candidate” qualifier on “reason”, but it should be clear from the context
where it is to be understood.
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the basis of that reason. To give an adequate version of the Causal Theory, then, is to
preclude deviant causal chains between reasons and the actions on which they are based.
We can start to get a better understanding of what this task requires by considering a
famous example from Davidson (1973, 79), which I’ve adapted slightly.
Climber. Chen is climbing with her friend Daria. They’ve reached a tricky bit
of the climb, and Daria has slipped, such that Chen is supporting all of Daria’s
weight on a rope. In order for Daria to get a good grip on the rocks again, Chen
needs to climb up a few feet, with Daria in tow. Chen pauses in the middle of
this arduous task to catch her breath. She reflects on the fact that it would ease
her burden to drop Daria. This unnerves Chen, causing her to drop Daria.
Climber has three key features. (i) Chen has a reason to drop Daria, namely that it would
ease her burden. (ii) That reason causes her to drop Daria. (iii) That reason is not Chen’s
basis for dropping Daria.
(i) is not contentious.7 (ii) is stipulated in the case. (iii) could use some defense, however.
Chen’s dropping Daria cannot be given a basing explanation in terms of its easing her burden:
that it would ease her burden does not make Chen’s dropping Daria intelligible by Chen’s
own lights.8 Hence, Chen’s dropping Daria is not an action based on the fact that it would
ease her burden.
In fact, Chen’s dropping Daria is not a rationally evaluable action at all. It is unfortunate,
tragic, regrettable, and so on, but it is neither rational nor irrational. It is not a manifestation
of Chen’s rational agency. So, in Climber, the deviance of the causal chain precludes what
the agent does from being a rationally evaluable action.9 Since the deviance of the causal
7That she has a reason to drop Daria doesn’t mean that Chen should drop Daria, or that it would
be good to drop her, or that it is permissible to drop Daria.
8If this claim needs support, suppose additionally that Chen relishes the extra challenge of hauling
Daria up this part of the climb. If anything, she thinks the fact that it would ease her burden
counts against dropping Daria.
9Chen’s dropping Daria may nonetheless be evaluable along other dimensions. Perhaps, in dropping
Daria, Chen manifests a vicious lack of self-control.
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chain results in mere operation rather than action, call this kind of case a deviant causal
chain to operation.
We must also contend with a different kind of deviant causal chain. Wedgwood (2006,
663) provides a helpful case, which I’ve adapted somewhat.
Arrest. Inspector Mallett finds the Professor’s handkerchief in the laundry basket.
This is highly incriminating evidence of the Professor’s guilt, but Mallett doesn’t
realize this. Nonetheless, the Professor thinks the game is up and confesses,
leading Mallett to arrest her. So Mallett’s finding the incriminating evidence
causes, by way of the confession, his arresting the Professor.
That he has uncovered incriminating evidence is a reason for Mallett to arrest the Professor.
Moreover, that reason causes Mallett to arrest the Professor. But he does not arrest the
Professor on the basis of that reason: we cannot give a basing explanation of the arrest by
appealing to the discovery of the handkerchief. Since Mallett doesn’t think the handkerchief
is incriminating, its discovery does not make the arrest intelligible from Mallet’s perspective.
Like in Climber, the causal chain from the reason to the doing in Arrest is deviant.
Unlike in Climber, however, the deviance in Arrest does not preclude the doing from being
a rationally evaluable action; rather, the deviance prevents the action from being based on
the reason that causes it. It doesn’t help to point out that there is another reason (that the
Professor confessed), which is causally relevant to the arrest and on which the arrest is based.
There is a crucial difference between two distinct causal chains: the first is from the discovery
of the incriminating evidence to Mallett’s arresting the Professor, and the second is from the
Professor’s confession to Mallett’s arresting her. The first is a deviant causal chain, as the
discovery of the handkerchief is not Mallett’s basis for arresting the Professor. The second
is nondeviant. It is the right kind of causal chain to constitute basing, as the confession is
the reason for which Mallett arrests the Professor. Cases like Arrest challenge us to explain
this difference between a deviant causal chain and a nondeviant one. Since this kind of case
does involve the agent’s acting, rather than merely operating, call it a deviant causal chain
to action.
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I take it to be a desideratum of a solution to the Problem of Deviant Causal Chains that
it gives a unified diagnosis of deviant causal chains both to operation (as in Climber) and to
action (as in Arrest). We’ll have some reason to think our solution is on the right track if we
can explain what is common to these different kinds of case.
2.1.2 The Problem of Rational Evaluability
Let’s set the Problem of Deviant Causal Chains aside for a moment and consider a different
problem: the Problem of Rational Evaluability. This might seem unwise. Why make life
trickier for ourselves before we’ve laid an already tough problem to rest? Since the two
problems are tightly connected, however, understanding what it will take to solve the Problem
of Rational Evaluability will pave the way for a new account of basing that successfully rules
out deviant causal chains.
Not all of the things that we are caused to do are rationally evaluable. Your extending a
knee when the doctor hits it with a reflex hammer is neither rational nor irrational. Moreover,
cases like Climber show that not even all of the things that we are caused to do by reasons
are rationally evaluable. The Problem of Rational Evaluability is to explain why some
doings-caused-by-reasons are rationally evaluable actions based on reasons, whereas other
doings-caused-by-reasons are mere operations. What is special about basing that makes
something a manifestation of rational agency (like moonwalking), rather than one of the
myriad arational things an agent is merely caused to do (like sleepwalking)? (For those
who can literally moonwalk in their sleep, it will only be their waking moonwalking that is
rationally evaluable.)10
10Marcus (2012) and Neta (2019) raise more or less what I’m calling the Problem of Rational
Evaluability. It is similar to, but distinct from, the Problem of Agential Authority (Bratman 2001;
see also Frankfurt 1978; Velleman 1992). The latter is the problem of explaining why some things
an agent is caused to do are attributable to her as an agent at all, whether they are rationally
evaluable or not. The Problem of Rational Evaluability is narrower, because some doings that
are attributable to agents as agents do not seem to be rationally evaluable. Sleepwalking (or
even sleepmoonwalking) might be an example. Or consider a spider spinning her web. Unlike
her metabolizing, her webspinning is a manifestation of the spider’s agency, but it doesn’t seem
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The Problem of Rational Evaluability and the Problem of Deviant Causal Chains are
closely connected. In particular, ruling out deviant causal chains to operation (like Chen’s
dropping Daria in Climber) requires distinguishing deviant causal relations from those that
constitute basing. This is just what a solution to the Problem of Rational Evaluability
demands: an account that explains why basing, but not other kinds of causation, secures
the rational evaluability of an action based on a reason. Hence, without a solution to the
Problem of Rational Evaluability, an account of basing will be vulnerable to deviant causal
chains to operation.
Suppose, for instance, that an account identifies some cluster of features, F , as those
constitutive of nondeviant causal chains. Suppose that the account doesn’t solve the Problem
of Rational Evaluability, however, because F does not suffice for rationally evaluable action.
Then—for all the account says—it will be possible for a causal chain to have F and yet for
the resultant doing to be an operation, rather than a rationally evaluable action. Such a
causal chain is a deviant causal chain to operation. Hence, the account does not solve the
Problem of Deviant Causal Chains after all. It is possible for a causal chain to be deviant
even while having the features that supposedly preclude deviance.
2.2 Towards a Solution to the Problem of Deviant Causal Chains
Considering the Problem of Rational Evaluability gets us on the right track to solving the
Problem of Deviant Causal Chains. Remember that we need to complete two tasks. First, we
must identify the extra feature of basing: whatever, more than mere causation by a reason,
is involved in instances of basing. Second, we must specify how the extra feature relates to
the agent’s action when it is based on a reason. Let’s see what implications the Problem of
Rational Evaluability has for each task in turn.
rationally evaluable. These issues are tricky; fortunately, we can ignore them here.
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2.2.1 The Extra Feature is Normative
What is the difference between Climber and a variant of the case where Chen does drop Daria
on the basis of the reason that it will ease her burden? Or the difference between my sending
the email because of a mere causal fluke and my sending it on the basis of the reason that
it will feel so darn good? The Problem of Rational Evaluability shows that the difference
is a normative one. When you act on the basis of a reason, what you do has a normative
status—it is more or less rational—that is not possessed by what you do when you merely
operate. The Problem of Rational Evaluability is, in effect, to account for this difference in
normative, rational status. We have a normative gap between rationally evaluable action
based on a reason, and mere operation.
This normative gap must somehow be bridged by the extra feature of basing. The extra
feature just is whatever basing, and not just mere causing by a reason, involves. So the
extra feature must somehow suffice to turn mere operation into based action. I suggest that
the way to bridge the normative gap is to appeal to something normative.11 The thought
here is broadly Humean. Just as it is unclear how to derive an “ought” from an “is”, so too
is it unclear how to imbue a mere operation with rational status—except by appealing to
something normative.12 The extra feature, then, should itself be something normative.13
11Perhaps the extra feature is not itself normative, but (combined with normative principles) is
normativity grounding. At the very least, the extra feature must be capable of having normative
upshot.
12The “it is unclear” locution is a deliberate hedge to avoid tricky questions about the strength of
the Humean argument. See Brown (2015) for discussion and references. Other than the Humean
argument, there is an inductive argument against trying to solve the Problem of Deviant Causal
Chains without appealing to a normative extra feature. The literature in this vicinity tends to
focus explicitly either on intentional actions, rather than intentional actions based on reasons, or
on attitudes based on reasons, rather than actions based on reasons. The relationship between
these notions is delicate, but there is enough overlap that discussion of one is usually relevant
to discussion of the others. For a good overview of deviant causal chains and failed attempts to
overcome them, in the context of intentional action, see Mayr (2011, ch. 5). And in the context of
attitudes (especially belief) based on reasons, see Sylvan (2016). Setiya (2013) argues that basing
differs in the cases of action and belief.
13Some recent treatments of basing have appealed to normativity. For instance, dispositional
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My claim is not that the extra feature must be irreducibly normative. Whether that is
the case depends on broader issues about normativity that it is not my business to adjudicate
here. My claim is that we make progress by identifying the extra feature as something
normative; whether its normativity can be reduced is an issue for another occasion. Before I
say just what kind of normativity the extra feature has, let’s consider how it might relate to
the agent’s action.
2.2.2 The Extra Feature is in the Agent’s Very Acting
Once again, the Problem of Rational Evaluability teaches an important lesson. It steers us
away from a tempting solution to the Problem of Deviant Causal Chains that is doomed to
fail. Call the causal ground of a doing the causally relevant factors that result in that doing.
Since nothing turns on it here and it simplifies things considerably, assume that for a factor
to be causally relevant is for it to (jointly) cause its effect. Then:
Tempting Solution. The causal chain between r and S’s φ-ing is nondeviant
just in case S’s φ-ing is jointly caused by: r and the extra feature of basing.14
The Tempting Solution has it that the right, nondeviant way of a reason’s causing an
action is for something else to be added to the causal ground. The extra feature of basing is
the thing that’s missing in cases like Climber and Arrest. The Tempting Solution has it
approaches have increasingly relied on normative dispositions or competences (Sosa 2015; Mantel
2017; Lord 2018). I don’t have anything against the ideology of dispositions as such, but I don’t
invoke it here for two reasons. First, I think that the normativity of the dispositions is doing the
heavy lifting in these accounts, rather than the appeal to dispositions themselves. This is partly
because of the second reason: it’s extremely hard to distinguish between the manifestation or
exercise of a disposition and mere causation in accordance with a disposition. In fact, I don’t
think that we can adequately make the distinction without either solving the Problem of Deviant
Causal Chains, or taking the distinction to be primitive. The former course is hopeless in the
present context. The latter is fine as far as it goes, but I don’t think that it sheds much light on
basing.
14Those who have succumbed to temptation include Velleman (1992) and Bratman (2001).Their
focus is the Problem of Agential Authority (see n. 10), rather than either of the two problems that
concern us here. But extending their accounts to basing in the natural way generates versions of
the Tempting Solution.
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that, whatever the extra feature is, it helps the reason to cause what the agent does. Perhaps
the action must also be caused by a judgment that the reason on which the agent acts is a
reason to so act. That successfully rules out both Climber and Arrest, since in neither case is
the deviant-causal-chain-initiating reason judged by the agent to be a reason for what she
does.
The failed attempts to defend the Tempting Solution provide strong inductive
evidence against it.15 But there is a deeper reason that the Tempting Solution fails to
solve the Problem of Deviant Causal Chains, a reason that suggests that the solution is
deeply misguided and not merely extensionally inadequate.
In a slogan, rationality ain’t in the cause. Because adding more to the causal ground
merely provides additional levers to move an agent to do what she does, it is unclear how this
could solve the Problem of Rational Evaluability. Recall that in Climber, Chen’s dropping
Daria is not rationally evaluable because it is just a churning of the causal order. Chen’s
dropping Daria is as little a manifestation of her rational agency as her dropping a glass when
startled by a loud noise. But if being caused to do something by a reason alone is merely being
buffeted about by the causal winds, rather than exercising one’s rational powers, how can it
help to add more winds? The basic challenge raised by the Problem of Rational Evaluability
is of explaining how the causal relation involved in basing yields a rationally evaluable action,
when such status is not conferred by causal relations in similar cases (Climber, Arrest).16
The challenge is not diminished by making the cause at the origin of the causal chain more
complicated.17
I have just made the case for the first premise of the following argument against the
15See Mayr (2011, ch. 5) for an overview.
16Mallett’s arresting the Professor is a rationally evaluable action, but then the problem is to explain
why this status is grounded in the causal chain initiated by the Professor’s confession, rather than
the one beginning with the discovery of the incriminating evidence.




(1) We cannot solve the Problem of Rational Evaluability just by adding things to
the causal ground of an action based on a reason.
(2) We cannot solve the Problem of Deviant Causal Chains without solving the
Problem of Rational Evaluability.
(3) Therefore, the Tempting Solution fails.
I argued for the second premise earlier, in §2.1.2: without a solution to the Problem of Rational
Evaluability, a putative solution to the Problem of Deviant Causal Chains is vulnerable to
deviant causal chains to operation. The conclusion follows from (1) and (2), because the
Tempting Solution encompasses any attempt to solve the Problem of Deviant Causal
Chains just by adding things to the causal ground.
As well as motivating a different solution to the Problem of Deviant Causal Chains,
the argument from (1) and (2) to (3) gives us some guidance as to how it should look. In
particular, the argument suggests that the Tempting Solution errs in locating the extra
feature of basing causally prior to what the agent does in acting on the basis of a reason. By
trying to ground rational evaluability in something prior to what the agent does, we seem
to leave no room for the agent herself to exercise her rational powers.19 If all the putative
work of rational agency is on the scene prior to the agent’s acting, it is no wonder that the
rational status of the action is not guaranteed.
18Frankfurt (1978) gives a different argument against fleshing out the Causal Theory by packing
items into the casual ground. His argument is weaker than mine because it assumes that causes
must precede their effects and so overlooks the possibility of causal sustenance that theorists like
Lord (2018) appeal to. Frankfurt also overgeneralizes from the failure of adding things to the
causal ground to the inadequacy of any causal account whatsoever.
19This kind of complaint has been forcefully made by agent-causation theorists, who argue that we
must invoke a special notion of causation to understand what happens when an agent acts (Mayr
2011). Like Velleman (1992), I think that the complaint is a good one, but am suspicious of a sui
generis notion of agent causation. See also Steward (2012, ch. 8).
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Hence, the extra feature of basing must be something that is not causally prior to what
the agent does in acting on the basis of a reason. But neither can the rational evaluability
of action stem from something causally posterior to what the agent does. We cannot turn
Chen’s dropping Daria into a rationally evaluable action by appealing to something that is
causally downstream from what she does. So the extra feature of basing is neither causally
prior nor causally posterior to what the agent does in acting on the basis of a reason. We
must, it seems, locate the extra feature in the agent’s very acting.20
Reflecting on the Problem of Rational Evaluability has led to two guiding thoughts in
tackling the Problem of Deviant Causal Chains. First, the extra feature of basing must be
normative. Second, the extra feature must in some sense be located in the agent’s very acting.
There are many ways we might develop these ideas. In what follows, I pursue just one such
way: I identify the extra feature as commitment and claim that it is constituted by the causal
chain from a reason to an agent’s action.21
2.3 The Hereby-Commit Account of Basing
2.3.1 Commitment
In §2.2.1, I argued that we should look to something normative in identifying the extra feature
of basing. In my view, the best candidate is commitment. An action based on a reason must
involve the agent’s commitment to that reason’s favoring that action. Part of what makes
20Hence, on my view basing is prime in a sense analogous to Williamson’s (2000, ch. 3). Lord (2018,
chs. 5–6) and Lord and Sylvan (2019) make the case that acting on the basis of a normative
reason is prime. That is, they argue that acting on the basis of a normative reason does not
decompose into two independent factors: (i) acting on the basis of a reason; and (ii) that reason
is a normative reason. Part of my contribution in this paper is to argue, in effect, that (i) is itself
prime: acting on the basis of a reason is not separable into an action-caused-by-a-reason and some
metaphysically independent extra feature.
21The whole causal chain, and not just the agent’s action, constitutes the extra feature for good
reason. If the extra feature of basing depended just on the agent’s action, then we could in
principle take the action and the extra feature and stick them at the end of a deviant causal chain.
To foreclose this possibility, we must ground the extra feature in the entire causal chain.
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the tax advantage—and not the benefit to others—the miser’s basis for donating is that the
miser, we can stipulate, is committed only to the tax advantage’s favoring donating.
When we think of commitments in everyday life, we often think of rich, deeply held
stances towards values, or towards other people: a commitment to justice, or a commitment
to one’s partner. The notion of commitment that interests us here is much thinner. A
commitment is a normative entity like an obligation. Hence, in its use as a term of art,
“being committed” need mean no more than being subject to a certain kind of normative
pressure. For instance, if one is committed to the truth of p, one is under rational pressure
not to be committed at the same time to the falsity of p.22 This is the sense of commitment
that philosophers invoke when they say things like, “If you accept both of those claims, then
you’re committed to this further one.”
Commitments, in my view, are grounded in an agent’s take on the world. An agent’s
perspective on how things are generates normative pressure: a perspective is constrained by
coherence; it is incoherent to be at once committed to the truth of p and to the falsity of p.
An agent’s take on the world is, in turn, grounded in certain of her representational states.23
For instance, you believe that Wheatums taste like cardboard; you take it as being that case
that Wheatums taste like cardboard. That part of your worldview grounds your commitment
to truth of “Wheatums taste like cardboard.” One’s take on the world needn’t be a merely
descriptive matter. One can represent it as being the case that, say, one ought to write a
scathing post about the lackluster taste of Wheatums on one’s breakfast blog.
Here I leave open whether one’s take on the world, and so one’s commitments, can
stem from representational states other than beliefs. What all commitment-generating
22For more on this use of “commitment”, and its relation to other kinds of commitment, see Wallace
(2001), Brewer (2003), Ross (2012), and Shpall (2014).
23See Boghossian (2014) and Neta (2018, 2019) for other representationalist construals of commitment.
My account of basing is also compatible with nonrepresentationalist views of commitment, including
pragmatism. Pragmatists ground commitments in irreducibly normative social practices, such
as holding one another accountable for what we say and do. Brandom (1994, 2000) is the most
explicit proponent of a pragmatist view of commitment, but see also Kripke (1982).
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representations have in common is that they represent their contents as being the case or
obtaining. Call such a representation an “obtaining representation” and contrast it with a
hope or a fear. When I hope that I finished the race in under two hours, I do not represent
the hoped-for content as obtaining. Indeed, as I catch my breath and wait for the official
result, I’m painfully aware of how unlikely it is that what I hope for obtains.
So an agent’s commitments are grounded in her obtaining representations.24 In virtue of
being committed to something an agent is thereby be subject to rational appraisal (Smith
2005; Hieronymi 2014; Neta 2018).25 My commitment not to leave despite the hurricane
warning licenses criticizing me, even if the storm fortunately misses my locale.
When an agent acts on the basis of a reason, she must be committed to that reason’s
favoring so acting. More carefully:
Commitment Constraint. S φ-s on the basis of r only if S is committed to
r’s favoring φ-ing.
We need the Commitment Constraint, or something very much like it, to understand
basing explanation (Davidson 1963). Recall that we can cite the basis on which someone acts
in order to explain what she does in a distinctive way. In particular, a basing explanation
makes what the agent does intelligible by her own lights. The miser’s donating to charity
makes sense from her point of view, given that her basis for donating was that it would
reduce her tax bill.
The Commitment Constraint underpins what’s going on when we give a basing
explanation. The constraint tells us that acting on the basis of a reason involves a commitment
to something’s favoring that action. Citing the basis of the action identifies what it is that
24On the proposed picture, an agent’s commitments stem from her obtaining representations closed
under structural rationality. So I might be committed to p in two ways. Either I have an obtaining
representation with the content that p, or I lack such a representation but structural rationality
commits me to p in virtue of the obtaining representations that I do have, e.g. my representation
that q and my representation that if q then p.
25This is the case for the commitments relevant to basing. Other kinds of commitment open one up
to other kinds of appraisal (Shpall 2014).
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the agent takes to favor her action. She may be completely wrong about that: perhaps the
miser’s donation is not tax deductible after all. Nonetheless, in donating on the basis of its
seeming to decrease her taxes, the miser takes something to count in favor of what she does.
This renders what she does intelligible from her own perspective.
Although it is an important step, identifying the extra feature does not by itself yield an
adequate account of basing. There are cases in which the Commitment Constraint is
met and yet basing is absent. Consider the following.
Climber Redux. This case is just like Climber, with the addition that Chen is
committed to the fact that it will ease her burden counting in favor of dropping
her climbing partner. Suppose, moreover, that this commitment and that reason
jointly unnerve Chen, and so cause her to drop Daria.
Climber Redux satisfies the Commitment Constraint, but the addition of a commitment
does not turn Chen’s dropping Daria into an action based on a reason. It is still just an
operation, a causal fluke beyond the purview of rational agency. Despite the commitment,
this is a deviant causal chain (to operation).
The existence of cases like Climber Redux should come as no surprise: it is predicted by
the argument in §2.2.2 against the Tempting Solution. Climber Redux adds a commitment
to the causal ground of Chen’s dropping Daria, but nonetheless results in an operation rather
than an action. While this commitment, like all commitments, is normative and opens the
door to rational appraisal, it does not make what Chen does rationally evaluable in the right
way. To see this, note that we might (stiltedly) evaluate Chen in virtue of that commitment
even had she not dropped Daria: “I’m glad you didn’t drop Daria, even though you were
correctly committed to its easing your burden favoring doing so.” This is why giving an
account of basing involves not just identifying the extra feature, but explaining how it relates
to the agent’s action.
We’ve made progress. We’ve identified the extra feature as commitment. Earlier, in
steering clear of the Tempting Solution, I suggested that the extra feature is itself
42
constituted by the causal chain between the reason and the agent’s action. Putting these two
things together, acting on the basis of a reason consists in: the causal chain constitutes the
agent’s commitment (to the reason’s favoring her so acting).
That, in a nutshell, is my account. I’ll first unpack it and then explain how it solves the
two problems.
2.3.2 A Bird’s-Eye View of the Explanatory Strategy
My account sheds light on acting on the basis of a reason by appealing to something that
basing constitutes. Consider an analogy.
What is it to promise? Whatever else it amounts to, promising involves doing something.
Perhaps you utter some words: “I promise to look at the website.” Or perhaps you nod your
head in response to being asked whether you promise to look at the website. But not just any
uttering of the words, nor any nodding of the head, amounts to promising. The words might
be uttered as part of a play, or the utterer might be a parakeet. And the noddings that aren’t
promisings are legion. So when is uttering the words or nodding your head promising? When
and only when your doing so constitutes a commitment to do the thing that’s promised.26
Uttering “I promise to look at the website” is promising in part because it constitutes a
change in your normative status.27 In the uttering or the nodding, you become committed
to looking at the website. That’s why what you do is promise, rather than merely utter or
nod. But becoming committed isn’t something you do over and above promising. It’s not
as though you have to perform two actions: promising and committing. Rather, becoming
committed is part of what it is to promise.
26See Shpall (2014) for discussion on the connection between promising and commitment.
27A wrinkle: the agent may already be committed to the content of her promise before she promises.
Perhaps she’s already committed to look at the website in virtue of her role as a webmaster.
Though the matter deserves more discussion than I can give it here, I think we can still make
sense of this as a change in normative status. It’s a kind of renewal of the commitment, and
importantly it stems from a different source: the very promising. If God were to annihilate the
agent’s prior commitment at the same time as she promises, the agent would still be committed
in virtue of the promise. Similar considerations apply to acting on the basis of a reason.
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For this kind of explanation to be illuminating, we need to say something informative
about the conditions under which the commitment is constituted. For example, uttering “I
promise to look at the website” constitutes a corresponding commitment only if: it is not
done as part of a play; it is not done under duress; the utterer is not a parakeet; and so on.
In this way, we shed light on what it is to promise.
This is the explanatory shape of my account of basing. Whatever else it amounts to,
acting on the basis of a reason involves the agent’s being caused to act by that reason. But,
as we’ve seen, not all doings-caused-by-reasons are actions done on the basis of those reasons.
So when is what an agent does an action based on a reason? When and only when what the
agent does is the terminus of a particular kind of causal chain: one that starts with the reason
and that constitutes a commitment to that reason’s favoring the action. The miser’s donating
to charity is an action based on a reason in part because it is the conclusion of a causal
chain that constitutes a change in her normative status. Hence, in the donating, the miser
becomes committed to its lowering her tax bill’s favoring donating to charity. But becoming
committed isn’t something an agent does over and above acting on the basis of a reason.
Even though we sometimes use “commit” to pick out a volitional act of will (as in “She
committed to living and dying by the sword”), that is not the thin sense that is of interest to
us. When an agent acts on the basis of a reason, this constitutes the onset of a normative,
ongoing state of being committed to the reason’s favoring the action; whether some volitional
act of committing is involved or not is independent of the issue of basing. So, it’s not as
though the miser has to perform two actions: donating and committing. Rather, becoming
committed is part of what it is to act on the basis of a reason. More specifically, in virtue of
the causal chain from the reason to the action, the miser has an obtaining representation
with the content that its lowering her tax bill favors donating to charity. The representation
grounds her commitment. So in order to become committed, she need do nothing more nor
less than act on the basis of the reason.
As in the case of promising, we need to say something informative about the conditions
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under which the constitution takes place.28 When does the causal chain between a reason
and a doing constitute the corresponding commitment? The constitution occurs just in case
what the agent does plays a certain functional role. Let me explain.
2.3.3 The Hereby-Commit Account
Recall the promising analogy. There are several ways in which you might promise to look at
the website. You might utter, “I promise to look at the website.” Or you might nod when
asked whether you promise to look at the website. Your uttering and your nodding both
play the same functional role. In the very uttering of the words or the nodding of your head,
you thereby commit to looking at the website. It’s as if you thought, “I hereby commit to
looking at the website,” although no such thought—explicit or otherwise—need accompany
your utterance or your nod. Rather, the sentence picks out the role that the very uttering or
nodding itself plays.
Just as a nod can play the functional role of committing an agent through her very
nodding, so too can a doing-caused-by-a-reason play the functional role of committing an
agent through her very doing. In particular, what the agent does plays the hereby-commit
functional role—when and only when what she does is act on the basis of a reason. It’s
as if she thought, “I hereby commit to the reason’s favoring so acting.” But, as one can
promise simply by nodding, the agent needn’t make any utterances or have any thoughts
about commitment. Rather, what the agent does itself plays the hereby-commit functional
role, and so is part of what constitutes the relevant commitment. On my view, committing
amounts to gaining a normative status in virtue of having an obtaining representation, not
performing a volitional act. Nonetheless, in playing the hereby-commit functional role, the
agent’s action is similar to a volitional act of commitment insofar as—in the very acting—the
28That we need to say something informative does not require that we specify completely independent
necessary and sufficient conditions. Hence I do not claim that my account is an analysis. My
project is thus in the spirit of Williamson’s (2000) knowledge-first program in epistemology, which
offers elucidation without analysis.
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agent becomes committed to something. If an agent wills anything when she acts on the
basis of a reason, it will likely be to performing the action itself rather than to committing to
the reason favoring the action. All the same, in the very doing of what she does, the agent
takes a rational stand and thereby commits to the reason’s favoring the action.
Putting all of this together yields my account of basing.
Hereby-Commit Account. S’s φ-ing on the basis of r consists in: (i) r
causes S’s φ-ing; (ii) r’s causing S’s φ-ing constitutes S’s having a corresponding
commitment—a commitment to r’s favoring φ-ing; that is, (iii) S’s φ-ing plays
the hereby-commit functional role, which is expressible by (but not reducible to)
S’s thinking “I hereby commit to r’s favoring so φ-ing.”29
The Hereby-Commit Account is a version of the Causal Theory. It construes acting
on the basis of a reason as the action’s being caused, in the right way, by the reason. The
right way is such that what the agent does is the terminus of a causal chain that constitutes
a corresponding commitment. Under what circumstances does the constitution occur? Just
in case what the agent does plays the hereby-commit functional role: in doing what she does,
the agent throws her rational weight behind the support that the reason provides for the
action.
In order to get a better handle on the account, let’s apply it to an example. That it
is raining is a reason I have to bring my umbrella. But the reason for which I bring the
umbrella is that it complements my outfit. According to the Hereby-Commit Account,
in bringing the umbrella I commit to something’s favoring bringing it. That I commit to its
complementing my outfit favoring bringing it is partly why my basis is fashion, rather than
function.
That’s the account. If it’s adequate, it should solve both the Problem of Deviant Causal
Chains and the Problem of Rational Evaluability.
29Clause (iii) is an elucidation of clause (ii), rather than an addition. But it is an important enough
elucidation to include it in the official statement of the account.
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2.3.4 The Problems Revisited
Start with the Problem of Rational Evaluability. As I argued in §2.1.2, without a solution to
that problem, there is no hope of solving the Problem of Deviant Causal Chains.
The problem is to explain why the doings-caused-by-reasons that are actions based on
those reasons (the miser’s donating the money) are rationally evaluable, when other doings-
caused-by-reasons (Chen’s dropping Daria) are not. On the Hereby-Commit Account,
what an agent does—when and only when she acts on the basis of a reason—plays the
hereby-commit functional role.
Because the corresponding commitment is partly constituted by, rather than being prior
to, what the agent does, she is not the hapless victim of prior causal forces. Her commitment
is not just another causal lever that conspires with the reason to buffet the agent about. Her
commitment instead reflects the agent’s making up her mind—in her very doing what she
does—about whether the reason favors the action. Borrowing some useful terminology from
Hieronymi (2014), to act on the basis of a reason involves settling the question of whether
that reason favors that action.30 Thus what the agent does is rationally evaluable because, in
settling the relevant question, the action reveals “the quality of [the agent’s] will” (Hieronymi
2014, 15).
Hence, by rejecting the chimera of the Tempting Solution, we see that what makes
an action based on a reason rationally evaluable ain’t in the cause, no matter how complex.
Rather, an action based on a reason is rationally evaluable because we locate the commitment
where it needs to be: in her very acting. In acting on the basis of a reason, an agent puts her
rational seal of approval on the reason’s favoring the action. The rational evaluability of an
action based on a reason is thus due to the agent’s manifesting rational agency in her very
acting, by thereby gaining the corresponding commitment.
Let’s now turn to the Problem of Deviant Causal Chains. The problem, recall, is to
30There are ways other than φ-ing on the basis of r to settle the question of whether r supports
φ-ing. For instance, one might simply judge that r favors φ-ing.
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specify the right way (the way that constitutes basing) of reason causing what the agent does.
The Hereby-Commit Account offers the following solution.
Solution. The causal chain from r to S’s φ-ing is nondeviant (that is, r causes
S’s φ-ing in the right way) just in case r causes S’s φ-ing such that S’s φ-ing
plays the hereby-commit functional role.
Solution gives the correct verdict in the cases of deviant causal chains that we’ve looked at.
Climber. Chen is at no point committed to its easing her burden favoring dropping Daria,
and so she cannot be committed in her very dropping of Daria.
Climber Redux. Chen’s dropping Daria is caused by a reason, and she is committed to
that reason’s favoring dropping Daria. But what Chen does fails to play the hereby-commit
functional role: her dropping Daria is not related to her commitment in the right way. Chen
does not become committed in the very dropping of Daria to its easing her burden favoring
dropping Daria.
Arrest. Mallett’s arresting the Professor is caused by the discovery of the incriminating
handkerchief. But his arresting the Professor does not play the hereby-commit functional
role with respect to the discovery of the handkerchief. Mallet does, in arresting the Professor,
thereby commit to a reason favoring arresting her. But the reason he thereby commits to is
that the Professor confessed. So the Hereby-Commit Account explains not only why
the causal chain from the discovery of the handkerchief is deviant (Mallett’s arresting the
Professor is not related to a handkerchief-involving commitment at all, and so not in the
right way), but also why the causal chain from the Professor’s confession is nondeviant (the
arrest is related to the confession-involving commitment in the right way).
I cannot guarantee that the Hereby-Commit Account gives the correct verdict in
every case. The literature brims with devious deviant causal chains that have foiled highly
sophisticated accounts of basing. But, in addition to illuminating the cases above, I am
optimistic about the account’s prospects for two reasons.
First, the Hereby-Commit Account makes progress on the Problem of Rational
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Evaluability, thereby eliminating a tricky source of deviant causal chains to operation.
Second, the account meets the desideratum of giving a unified explanation of deviant
causal chains both to operation and to action. The common source of deviance is the lack
of the right kind of connection between the corresponding commitment and what the agent
does. This is manifest in what the agent does not playing the hereby-commit functional role
with respect to the relevant commitment. So for deviant causal chains both to operation and
to action alike, the deviant chain begins with a reason and ends with a doing; however, in the
very performance of the doing the agent does not commit to that reason’s favoring so doing.
That does not mean we can put the hereby-committing action at the end of another causal
chain and guarantee that we still have an instance of basing. What makes a causal chain
nondeviant is not just that it happens to terminate in a hereby-committing action. Rather,
what it is for a causal chain to be nondeviant is for it to terminate in a hereby-committing
action: the whole chain constitutes the relevant commitment.
Before concluding I need to consider an objection.
2.4 An Objection and a Reply
According to the Hereby-Commit Account, the corresponding commitment of an action
based on a reason is constituted by the causal chain from the reason to the action. Thus
what the agent does partly constitutes the corresponding commitment. It follows that the
commitment can be neither causally nor temporally prior to what the agent does. This seems
to make impossible a commonplace kind of case. Consider in more detail my bringing the
umbrella because it complements my outfit.
Umbrella. I’m deliberating about whether to bring the umbrella or not. As
I consider the reasons for and against bringing it, I realize that the umbrella
complements my outfit.31 Moreover, I commit to its complementing my outfit
favoring bringing the umbrella (perhaps by believing that to be the case). After
31Since I might (tragically) be mistaken about the umbrella’s sartorial synergy, this is a nonfactive
use of “realize”.
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a few seconds, that commitment is part of what causes me to bring the umbrella
along as I head out of the door.32
I don’t deny that cases like Umbrella are possible and involve acting on the basis of a reason.
Nor do I deny that it is a case in which a commitment is causally and temporally prior to
what the agent does. But I do deny two things, by way of reply to the objection.
First, I deny that all cases of acting on the basis of a reason are like Umbrella in involving
a causally or temporally prior commitment. Second, I deny that the prior commitment in
Umbrella is the corresponding commitment of what the agent does—the thing that makes
what she does an action based on a reason rather than an operation. Let me develop each
point in turn.
While cases like Umbrella are commonplace, so are cases like the following.
Small Talk. In the midst of some mundane chitchat, you make a remark about
the weather. I reply, “Yes, it’s a lovely day.” Later, an anthropologist who
observed our discussion asks me why I acted the way I did. I respond that I did
so because it was polite.
The anthropologist in Small Talk requests a basing explanation of my replying to you in the
way that I did. The reason I cite as my basis is that it was polite. Whether or not agents
are generally correct about their bases for acting, let’s stipulate that I am correct about my
basis in Small Talk: the basing explanation I offer is a good one. Given the Commitment
Constraint, it follows that in Small Talk I am committed to its being polite favoring
replying “Yes, it’s a lovely day.” The question is: does my commitment have to be causally
or temporally prior to my replying?
The most natural answer to this question is: no. In Small Talk and cases like it, what I
do is too mundane, too quick, and too automatic for my commitment to need to be prior to
what I do. Rather, this is a case in which my commitment reveals itself in my very acting.
32More accurately but also more cumbersomely: the representation that grounds the commitment is
part of what causes me to bring the umbrella along.
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Call what’s going on here basing in action.33
Of course, one could dig in one’s heels and interpret Small Talk in the same way as
Umbrella, insisting that my commitment is in some way prior to what I do. But why would one
want to? It is better, in the absence of good evidence to the contrary, to interpret cases in the
most natural way possible. In cases of basing in action, the most natural interpretation does
not require a commitment prior to what the agent does. The Hereby-Commit Account
captures this nicely: in Small Talk, my commitment reveals itself in action, because what I
do partly constitutes that commitment.
Even if I am right about cases of basing in action, like Small Talk, one might worry that
the objection stands for cases like Umbrella. In Umbrella, it’s agreed on all sides that there
is a commitment causally and temporally prior to what the agent does. So perhaps what we
need is a disjunctive account that accepts the Hereby-Commit Account for basing in
action, but not otherwise.
This won’t work. We need to distinguish cases like Umbrella from cases like the following.
Umbrella Redux. Like Umbrella up to and including my commitment to its
complementing my outfit favoring bringing the umbrella. But now the commitment
causes me to become distracted about my appearance such that, in striking a
pose in front of the mirror, the hooked handle of the umbrella (unbeknownst to
me) catches on my coat pocket as I head out of the door. There is no reason at
all for which I bring the umbrella.
Umbrella Redux, like Climber Redux, is an example of a commitment-involving deviant
causal chain to operation. My commitment is causally and temporally prior to my bringing
the umbrella, but what I do is not a rationally evaluable action.
So, although Umbrella Redux involves a commitment, it is not the corresponding com-
mitment of an action based on a reason. There is no corresponding commitment: there is no
commitment that makes it the case that the agent acts on the basis of the reason.
33I intend to evoke the term “intention in action”, which philosophers apply to structurally similar
cases focused on intention. The term was coined, or at least popularized, by Searle (1983, 84).
But earlier theorists were employing the concept (e.g. Anscombe 1963, §20).
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For the reasons that I gave in §2.2.2, in order to distinguish Umbrella from its redux
version, we must locate the extra feature (the corresponding commitment) in the very doing
of what the agent does. Properly distinguishing the two cases requires solving the Problem
of Rational Evaluability. That requires allowing what the agent does itself to play the
hereby-commit functional role: it’s the very bringing of the umbrella that functions as my
rationally endorsing the favoring relation between the umbrella’s complementing my outfit
and my bringing it. So, lest we leave ourselves unable to solve the Problem of Rational
Evaluability (and thereby unable to give an account of basing inoculated against deviant
causal chains), it must be that the corresponding commitment is partly constituted by what
the agent does. This holds even for cases like Umbrella, where the agent already has a prior
commitment with the same content as the corresponding commitment.34
None of this means that, in cases like Umbrella, the prior commitment does not play an
important role in what the agent does. But the role is not that of being the corresponding
commitment, the constituted extra feature that makes what the agent does an action based
on a reason. In the case of Umbrella, the corresponding commitment (with the content that
the umbrella’s complementing my outfit favors bringing it) is partly constituted by my very
bringing the umbrella. This is compatible with my prior commitment being part of the
complete explanation of why I bring the umbrella.
So the objection does not stick. Having the causal chain constitute the corresponding
commitment does not rule out commonplace cases like umbrella. Moreover, the constitution
claim is not only compatible with Umbrella, but also helps to make sense of basing in action,
as in Small Talk.
34In fact, I do not think that the corresponding commitment and the prior commitment in Umbrella
have the same contents. The content of the prior commitment involves an action type, whereas
the content of the corresponding commitment involves an action token. It’s as if the agent
thinks, “I hereby commit to that reason’s favoring this particular action.” I cannot argue for this
here, however, and supposing that the commitments’ contents are the same only strengthens the
objection. Even granting that the two commitments have the same contents, we can still think
of the corresponding commitment as being a renewal of the prior one, rather than a brand new
commitment, depending on the details of the case. See n. 27.
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Conclusion
The Causal Theory construes acting on the basis of a reason as being caused (in the right
way) to act by that reason. Spelling out what the right way amounts to requires solving the
Problem of Deviant Causal Chains. This involves two tasks: identifying the extra feature of
basing, and explaining how the extra feature relates the agent’s action.
I argued that the pursuit of these tasks should be guided by reflecting on the Problem of
Rational Evaluability. This problem challenges us to explain why actions based on reasons
are rationally evaluable when other doings, even some of those caused by reasons, are not.
We must solve the Problem of Rational Evaluability to solve the Problem of Deviant Chains.
To do so, we must allow the extra feature of basing to be normative and we must locate it, in
some sense, in the agent’s very acting.
I did this by developing the Hereby-Commit Account, a version of the Causal
Theory that solves both the Problem of Rational Evaluability and the Problem of Deviant
Causal Chains. According to my account, the extra feature of a basing is a normative
commitment to the basis favoring the action. The extra feature is constituted by the
causal chain from the reason to the action. The causal chain constitutes the corresponding
commitment just in case what the agent does plays the hereby-commit functional role. The
agent’s action itself functions as her thereby rationally endorsing the favoring relation between
the reason and her action. In this way, the rationality of action is where it needs to be: in
the agent’s very acting.
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CHAPTER 3: BASING AND THE COLLAPSE OF LOGICAL PLURALISM
Introduction
Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic (Beall and Restall 2006).
Recently, several authors have argued against pluralism on the grounds that it collapses into
monism (Priest 2006; Read 2006; Keefe 2014; Stei 2020). The core of the Collapse Objection
is that only the pluralist’s strongest logic does genuine normative work.1 Since a logic must
do genuine normative work, the putative pluralist is really a monist, who is committed to her
strongest logic being the one true logic.2 Pluralists have responded in various ways, including:
embracing contextualism about attributions of validity (Caret 2016); denying that logic is
normative (Russell 2017; Blake-Turner and Russell 2018); and denying that logic is topic
neutral (Kouri Kissel and Shapiro 2017).
In this paper, I do three things. First, in §3.1, I formulate the Collapse Objection in a
way that highlights a question that has been neglected in the debate: what is it for a logic
to do genuine normative work? Both proponents and opponents of the Collapse Objection
implicitly assume that genuine normative work must be cashed out in terms of all-or-nothing
notions, such as entitlement or obligation. Rejecting this assumption paves the way for the
Collapse Objection to be resisted by allowing a logic to do genuine normative work that is
nondecisive, for instance by generating pro tanto reasons.
1Bueno and Shalkowski (2009) argue for the modal, rather than the normative, collapse of Beall
and Restall’s pluralism. While Bueno and Shalkowski raise an interesting challenge for logical
pluralism, I focus here solely on the problem that stems from logic’s connection to normativity.
2The provenance of the objection is somewhat hard to pin down. Beall and Restall (2006, 94, n.
7) attribute it to Gary Kemp and Stephen Read. Read (2006) credits the original version of the
challenge to a manuscript of Priest’s, published as (Priest 2001). Stei (2020, 421) traces a similar
objection to Williamson (1988, 112).
54
Second, in §3.2, I investigate more generally what it is for a logic to do genuine normative
work. I give considerations independent of the Collapse Objection for broadening our
normative horizons along three dimensions. First, given the importance of reasons throughout
our normative lives, we should consider pro tanto normative contributions as well as all-
or-nothing ones. Second, I foreground a neglected kind of principle connecting logic to
normativity. Basing principles concern not combinations of attitudes, but how an agent’s
attitudes are based on one another. This kind of normative contribution is warranted because
good reasoning has to do not only with how an agent’s attitudes cohere with one another, but
also how her attitudes are supported by one another. Third, taking seriously the motivations
of nonclassical logicians suggest that we should consider the normative upshot of logical facts
about invalidity, as well as validity.
Finally, in §3.3 and §3.4, I revisit the Collapse Objection in light of this discussion. I
suggest two promising principles (couched in terms of reasons and basing) for the pluralist.
I argue that adopting at least one of these principles allows the pluralist to resist collapse.
A pluralist’s weaker logics can earn their normative keep by making a difference to what
reasons an agent has, even if they don’t make a difference to what she is entitled or obligated
to believe.
3.1 The Collapse Objection
Here is the Collapse Objection in its most general form.
(1) Work. All logics do genuine normative work.
(2) Only One Works. One and only one logic does genuine normative work.
(3) Therefore, there is one and only one logic.
According to Work, a logic must make a genuine normative difference to agents. It’s agreed
on all sides that there are different things we might call “consequence relations”, which we
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can define semantically or proof-theoretically. The point of contention is whether more than
one of these is a genuine logic, rather than a mere piece of mathematical machinery. For
a logic, K, to be a genuine logic in this sense, K must do genuine normative work: the
K-validity (or K-invalidity) of an argument must make a genuine normative difference to
what an agent believes or does.
Work is consistent with a wide variety of positions about the source of logic’s normative
significance. It might be that what it is to be a logic is to be normative (Field 2009a). Or
it might be that a logical theory comes with bridge principles that determine normative
consequences given facts about validity and invalidity (MacFarlane 2004; Steinberger 2019a).
Finally, a logic might do genuine normative work not because the logic itself is normative, but
because logical facts have normative upshot when coupled with general background epistemic
principles (Russell 2017; Blake-Turner and Russell 2018).3
This construal of the Collapse Objection is deliberately idiosyncratic. It focuses our
attention on a question: what is it for a logic to do genuine normative work? This question
deserves more attention than it has been given in the collapse literature. Both friends and
foes of collapse tend to assume one particular conception of genuine normative work. After
articulating that conception and explaining how it leads to collapse, I will argue that we
should broaden our normative horizons to consider more inclusive notions of normative work.
Doing so both shifts the collapse debate to more productive territory, and makes room for a
new pluralist response to the Collapse Objection.
Before getting to that, however, I’m going to make two assumptions to ease exposition.
First, I assume that the pluralist endorses a set of logics, L, with the following structure: one
of the logics in L is strictly strongest.4 This assumption is warranted both because leading
3See Stei (2019) for an argument that even views that eschew logic’s normativity are vulnerable to
collapse.
4Ki is the strictly strongest logic in L just in case: Ki ∈ L and for any other Kj ∈ L, for all sets of
sentences, Γ, and sentences, α: (a) if Γ Kj α, then Γ Ki α; and (b) for some ∆, β, ∆ Ki β and
∆ 2Kj β. Informally, the strictly strongest logic validates all, but not only, the arguments that the
other logics validate. (I’ll use “Γ K α” to mean that the argument from the set of premises, Γ, to
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pluralists endorse logics with that structure (Beall and Restall 2006), and because variants of
the Collapse Objection can be pressed against pluralists whose logics are differently structured
(Keefe 2014; Stei 2020). Second, I assume that the pluralist endorses only two logics: a
strictly strongest logic, and a weaker one. It is easy to generalize the Collapse Objection
to more logics. For concreteness, I suppose that the pluralist’s strictly strongest logic is
(propositional) classical logic, CL, and that she also endorses (propositional) relevance logic,
R.5
To understand the Collapse Objection, we need to be more precise about what it is for a
logic to do genuine normative work. Both proponents and opponents of the Collapse Objection
implicitly construe such work in all-or-nothing terms, that is in terms of entitlements or
obligations. Here are a few representative quotations (original emphasis).6
[S]uppose. . . we know that [the premises of a valid argument are] true. . . Should
we, or should we not conclude that [the conclusion] is true? (Read 2006, 194–195)
[A]re we, or are we not, entitled to accept [the conclusion of an argument]? Either
we are, or we are not: there can be no pluralism about this (Priest 2006, 203).
[T]here is a single relation which tracks the preservation of entitlement, and you
can’t be a pluralist about that (Beall and Restall 2006, 94).
[T]here cannot be many conflicting ways that we should reason (Keefe 2014,
1379).
These authors differ in various respects. But they agree on taking the crucial normative issue
the conclusion, α, is K-valid. The double turnstile is just a piece of notation: I assume nothing
here about the priority of model-theoretic construals of consequence.)
5There are many logics that go by the name “relevance” or “relevant” logic. For influential expositions
see Anderson and Belnap Jr. (1976) and Anderson, Belnap Jr., and Dunn (1992). I’ll use “R” to
refer to the relevance logic endorsed by Beall and Restall (2006).
6Given the context-sensitivity of deontic modals, we need to assume an implicit contextual restriction,
such as “According to the rational dictates of logic.”
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with respect to the Collapse Objection to be an all-or-nothing notion: an entitlement or an
obligation.7 More precisely:
All-or-Nothing Normative Work. A logic does genuine normative work if
and only if it makes an all-or-nothing normative difference: a difference to what
an agent is entitled or obligated to do.
There are many different ways of construing All-or-Nothing Normative Work, but it
will be helpful to have one to focus on. Consider the following principle (Caret 2016, 9; Stei
2020, 426).
Oughts from Validity. For any logic, K, if Γ K α, then S ought to be such
that she does not both: believe each γ ∈ Γ and disbelieve α.
So let’s suppose that a logic makes an all-or-nothing normative difference—and thereby does
genuine normative work—by way of Oughts from Validity. This will ease exposition
without loss of generality.8
Now that we have a handle on what it is for a logic to do genuine normative work, we
can see how friends of the Collapse Objection argue for Only One Works. They claim
that the pluralist’s weaker logic, R, does no genuine normative work. There are two cases
to consider. R can do genuine normative work either when it agrees with CL about an
argument’s validity, or when it disagrees with CL about an argument’s validity.9
7This agreement is almost universal among those who discuss the Collapse Objection. The only
exception I’m aware of is Steinberger (2019a, 2). However, while he explicitly mentions the
possibility that logics generate pro tanto reasons, his argument only focuses on all-or-nothing
notions.
8It will take some work to see how this supposition does not exclude views that eschew bridge
principles like Oughts from Validity (Russell 2017; Blake-Turner and Russell 2018). I can’t do
that work here, but see Stei (2019) to get a sense of how it will go.
9Extant versions of the Collapse Objection focus exclusively on cases where the logics disagree.
This is a mistake. Just because the logics agree doesn’t mean that only one of them does genuine
normative work. I’ll argue for this in §3.3.
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The logics agree. Consider any argument that is R-valid, say: {P, P → Q} R Q.10 Since
CL is the strictly strongest logic, that argument is also CL-valid: {P, P → Q} CL Q. By
Oughts from Validity, both R and CL generate an obligation for an agent to be such
that she doesn’t both believe the premises and disbelieve the conclusion. But obligations
don’t stack: only one of them is normatively efficacious.11 Which one? Well, as we’re about
to see, only CL does work when the logics disagree. So, by applying a normative razor and
declining to proliferate sources of normativity, we also let CL do the work when the logics
agree. Hence, R does no genuine normative work.
The logics disagree. Since CL is the strictly strongest logic, disagreement must involve
an argument’s CL-validity and R-invalidity. Consider in particular the argument from P to
Q∨¬Q, which is CL-valid but R-invalid. Suppose the pluralist believes that P . By Oughts
from Validity and the CL-validity of the argument, the pluralist ought either to give up
her belief that P , or not disbelieve that Q ∨ ¬Q. So CL makes a difference to what the
pluralist ought to do; it does genuine normative work. R, however, makes no normative
difference whatsoever: Oughts from Validity determines that a logic, K, has normative
upshot only if an argument is K-valid. But the argument is not R-valid. Hence, R does no
genuine normative work.
Generalizing the preceding line of thought yields a more thorough argument for the
collapse of logical pluralism:
(1) Work. All logics do genuine normative work.
10Since Oughts from Validity is silent when an argument is K-invalid, set aside the case where
the logics agree on the invalidity of an argument. But see n. 36.
11This is a little quick. It might be normatively important that I have multiple grounds for one
and the same obligation. For example, I’ve promised both Amari and Bakari to go to the party.
If, say, Amari relieves me of my obligation, I’m still obligated to go in virtue of my promise to
Bakari. And if neither relieves me, they both have a claim on my going. This is right, but I’m
going to set it aside for present purposes. There are tricky issues in thinking through whether the
analogy carries over to logic. But, to the extent that it does, this only helps my case: it’s another
potential source of genuine normative work both to be considered in general and for pluralists to
draw on when resisting the Collapse Objection.
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(1.1) All-or-Nothing Normative Work. A logic does genuine normative work if
and only if it makes an all-or-nothing normative difference: a difference to what
an agent is entitled or obligated to do.
(1.2) Whether the pluralist’s logics agree or disagree, only the strongest logic makes
an all-or-nothing normative difference.
(2) Only One Works. One and only one logic does genuine normative work.
(3) Therefore, there is one and only one logic.
Making explicit the structure of the argument highlights the important role that a particular
conception of genuine normative work is playing. All-or-Nothing Normative Work
is usually left implicit and so escapes scrutiny. At the very least, friends of the Collapse
Objection need to make a case for it, which they have not yet done.12 Moreover, it’s worth
exploring—independent of concerns about collapse—the normative landscape. Does Oughts
from Validity exhaust what it is for a logic to do genuine normative work? After exploring
this general question in §3.2, I’ll return to the Collapse Objection in §3.3. There I’ll suggest
two normative principles that are promising for the pluralist. Adopting either principle allows
her weaker logic to do genuine normative work in a way that buttresses her pluralism against
collapse.
3.2 Broadening Our Normative Horizons
Why think that logic has anything to do with normativity at all? A very natural and widely
accepted answer is that logic is centrally bound up with reasoning, which is a normative
enterprise (Priest 2006, 191–192, 196). There are right and wrong, better and worse, ways
12In §3.4, I consider a case for All-or-Nothing Normative Work on behalf of the friend of
collapse.
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of reasoning. A logic—a genuine logic and not just a piece of mathematics—has upshot for
that.13
With this broad motivation in mind, let’s revisit Oughts from Validity.
Oughts from Validity. For any logic, K, if Γ K α, then S ought to be such
that she does not both: believe each γ ∈ Γ and disbelieve α.
There are three dimensions along which we might vary Oughts from Validity when
thinking about what it is for a logic to do genuine normative work.14
First, we might vary the normative notion. Second, we might vary the object of that
normative notion. Third, we might vary which logical facts are taken into account. Let’s
consider each possibility in turn.
3.2.1 Reasons-Related Principles
There is more to normative life than all-or-nothing notions. In addition to entitlements and
obligations, the normative landscape is comprised of pro tanto reasons that can be weighed
and balanced.15 Although I ought not eat a second piece of cake, I have a reason to do
13There are important differences with respect to how this might work, for instance by guiding
agents in deliberation, or by serving as standards of correctness for reasoning (Steinberger 2019b).
But we can set them aside here. It’s worth stressing that, as mentioned in §3.1, I am neutral
about how logic has normative upshot in general, and for reasoning in particular. Hence, the
present discussion is compatible with the claim that a logic only has upshot for reasoning when
combined with background normative principles (Russell 2017; Blake-Turner and Russell 2018).
There are those who deny that logic has any bearing on reasoning at all. Harman (1986) is usually
interpreted this way, though I suspect that Harman’s position is better put as: logic has no special
upshot for reasoning. What that means, and whether it is a good reading of Harman, are matters
for another occasion. For now, let’s develop the debate as one among the many who think that,
in some way or other, logic has an important connection to the normative enterprise of reasoning.
14These are not the only dimensions along which we might further explore the normative upshot of
logic. Others include: logic has normative upshot only when a logical fact is known or believed by
an agent (MacFarlane 2004), or when a logical fact is obvious (Field 2009b); logic’s normative
upshot is not for patterns of beliefs and disbeliefs but for credences (Field 2009b) or perhaps
includes other doxastic attitudes like suspension; and so on.
15I do not mean to suggest that this exhausts the normative landscape. Nor do I take a stand on
the prospects of reducing the all-or-nothing notions to reasons, or vice versa. Furhtermore, I will
assume that “ought” is not pro tanto: it always picks out an all-or-nothing obligation.
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so: it’s delicious. If we focus just on what I ought to do, we exclude an important part of
the normative landscape. It matters, normatively speaking, that I have a reason to eat the
second piece of cake. Among other things, it makes it appropriate for me to have attitudes
that it might otherwise be inappropriate to have (Dancy 2004, 4–6). For instance, I might
appropriately feel a tinge of regret at not having had less to eat earlier, even as I dutifully
refrain from eating the second piece of cake. If the cake were not delicious and I lacked any
reason to eat the second piece, my regretful attitude would not be appropriate in this way.
Thus one way of changing Oughts from Validity is to deploy a pro tanto notion
(reason) rather than an all-or-nothing one (ought). For instance:
Reasons from Validity. For any logic, K, if Γ K α, then S has a reason to
be such that she does not both: believe each γ ∈ Γ and disbelieve α.
When thinking about what it is for a logic to do genuine normative work, two considerations
count in favor of reasons-related principles like Reasons from Validity. The first
consideration is broad. As mentioned, reasons play an important role in our normative lives
in general and so we need an argument for banning reasons from the part of our normative
lives to which logic is relevant.16
The second consideration is specific to logic. Consider the preface paradox (Makinson
1965; Ryan 1991). Let ∆ be the set of claims in the body of your book, and let β be their
conjunction. By Oughts from Validity and the fact that ∆  β, you ought either to stop
believing at least one δ ∈ ∆, or not disbelieve β.17 When you check the claims in your book,
each one seems true and your belief in it is confirmed. But you also believe that you are
fallible and that you, like the authors that have gone before you, have made a false claim
somewhere in your book. That is, you believe ¬β. Assuming that believing ¬β is tantamount
16In §3.4, I consider an objection: logics do generate reasons, but that is not genuine normative
work—the kind of normative difference that a logic must make to count as a genuine logic.
17Even very weak logics like FDE validate conjunction introduction (Omori and Wansing 2017).
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to disbelieving β, you violate Oughts from Validity: you believe each δ ∈ ∆ and yet
disbelieve β.18
There are many ways one might diagnose the problem with the preface paradox (Kaplan
1996; Christensen 2004). But a very natural thought is that Oughts from Validity is the
culprit. One need not abandon the principle altogether, but merely exclude preface cases from
its scope. Grant this for the sake of argument. Oughts from Validity misfires in preface
cases and fails to generate an obligation.19 Hence, you can be perfectly within your rational
rights to believe each of the claims in your book while disbelieving their conjunction. Still,
there is some normative pressure not to disbelieve the conjunction; if there were no normative
pressure against disbelieving the conjunction at all, it’s hard to see how the paradox could
be compelling.
This normative residue is well explained by logic’s providing reasons (MacFarlane 2004).
The fact that β is a consequence of ∆ provides a reason not to disbelieve β.20 Even if this
reason is outweighed by strong countervailing considerations—your fallibility, a large body of
inductive evidence, and so on—the reason generated by logic explains the normative pressure
18The assumption is not uncontroversial, but we needn’t get bogged down in that here. See Priest
(2006, 103–115) for discussion.
19Beall and Restall (2006, 16–17) themselves instead suggest that the preface paradox involves an
epistemic dilemma. To the extent that this handling of preface cases is adequate, it undermines
the argument for logic’s generating reasons that I am about to make. There are two issues with
Beall and Restall’s solution to the preface paradox, however. First, it is a general desideratum
of our normative theories that they avoid positing dilemmas. This is not a fixed point, but we
should avoid positing dilemmas in the absence of alternative solutions (of which there are many
for the preface paradox). Second, Beall and Restall (2006, 17) write as though logic’s normative
upshot in preface cases is overridden by the considerations against believing β: “[t]he normativity
of logical consequence remains, even if in this circumstance it is trumped by other norms.” This
certainly chimes with most intuitive verdicts, but it is hard to see how, if logic’s normativity is
“trumped” in preface cases, they are instances of genuine dilemmas. The trumping talk is better
accounted for by saying that there is strong normative pressure (from logic) to believe β, but
this pressure is outweighed by the inductive and other pressure against believing β. But that is
precisely to couch logic’s normative upshot in pro tanto terms, as I am about to recommend.
20Assume that, in the preface case, the following way of satisfying the wide-scope Reasons from
Validity is rationally unavailable: giving up a belief in at least one δ. For discussion on wide-scope
normative principles, see Greenspan (1975), Broome (1999), Schroeder (2004), and Lord (2014).
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not to disbelieve the conjunction of the claims of your book; it also licenses the unease you
feel in so disbelieving.
3.2.2 Basing Principles
Recall:
Oughts from Validity. For any logic, K, if Γ K α, then S ought to be such
that she does not both: believe each γ ∈ Γ and disbelieve α.
Let’s hold fixed, for the time being, the normative notion as an “ought.” We might nonetheless
explore another dimension of genuine normative work by varying the object of the normative
notion. Let me explain.
Oughts from Validity’s normative notion applies to being in a certain kind of state:
believing each of the premises of a valid argument while at the same time disbelieving the
conclusion. Oughts from Validity is thus a combinatorial principle. It precludes the
agent from having a certain combination of attitudes. I suggest that, in broadening our
normative horizons, we should also consider basing principles. For example:
Oughts (Basing) from Validity. For any logic, K, if Γ K α, then S ought
to be such that: if she believes each γ ∈ Γ, then she bases a belief in α on her
beliefs in each γ ∈ Γ.21
21Unlike the other principles, I’ve construed the claim within the scope of the normative notion
as a conditional. I intend this to be a material conditional, such that Oughts (Basing) from
Validity is equivalent to: “For any logic, K, if Γ K α, then S ought to be such that she does
not both: believe each γ ∈ Γ and fail to base a belief in α on her beliefs in each γ ∈ Γ.” The
formulation in the main text has the advantage of avoiding the awkward-to-parse “does not. . .
fail to base a belief.” Similar remarks will reply to the formulation of Reasons (Basing) from
Validity in §3.3. Non-basing principles admit variation with respect to their polarity (MacFarlane
2004; Field 2009b). That is, positive non-basing principles have the agent believing α, whereas
negative non-basing principles have the agent not disbelieving α. These are importantly different
because I am able not to disbelieve α by suspending judgment about α, but I cannot thereby
believe α. Basing principles admit of a similar distinction. Oughts (Basing) from Validity
is a positive principle: it concerns basing a belief in α. We could formulate a negative version
of the principle as follows: for any logic, K, if Γ K α, then S ought to be such that she does
not both: believe each γ ∈ Γ, and base a disbelief in α on her beliefs in each γ ∈ Γ. While this
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This principle says, roughly, that an agent ought not believe each of the premises of a valid
argument without at the same time basing a belief in the conclusion on those premise-beliefs.
Thus, rather than applying to a combination of attitudes, the principle applies to how an
agent’s attitudes are based on one another.
As it stands, Oughts (Basing) from Validity is not very plausible. Suppose some of
my beliefs, {P1 . . . Pn}, entail a conclusion, Q. It seems that I needn’t go wrong in failing to
base a belief in Q on my beliefs in P1 . . . Pn.22 Perhaps the conclusion is extremely complicated
and it doesn’t make sense to think that I ought to believe it at all. Or perhaps I already
believe the conclusion on other conclusive grounds, {Pn+1 . . . Pn+m}.
Although the specific principle is suspect, the move to basing principles in general is well
motivated. One thing involved in reasoning is ensuring that our attitudes hang together in a
coherent way. Oughts from Validity—the principle we started with and that is assumed
in the collapse debate—certainly speaks to this, as it prohibits inconsistent combinations
of attitudes. But reasoning involves more than this. It also involves considering how our
attitudes are based on one another. When I reason well, I don’t just end up at an attitude
that is consistent with my other attitudes; I end up with an attitude that is supported by my
other attitudes. Reasoning correctly can ensure our attitudes are properly based (Boghossian
2014; McHugh and Way 2018; Neta 2019).23
principle would avoid the issues with Oughts (Basing) from Validity I’m about to raise, it
won’t ultimately help the pluralist. All the normative work would still be done by the strongest
logic. Nonetheless, further discussion of polarity, and other dimensions of normative variation, is
warranted in a more systematic investigation of basing principles than I can give here.
22In order to ease exposition I will occasionally, as here, be sloppy about the normative upshot of
wide-scope principles. Strictly, Oughts (Basing) from Validity has me go wrong either in
failing to base a belief in Q on my beliefs in P1 . . . Pn or in not giving up one of my beliefs in
P1 . . . Pn. All the principles I consider here, including those in §3.3 that I suggest the pluralist
should adopt, are officially wide scope in formulation. Hence, there will be multiple ways of
abiding by them, even if I do not always flag that in the main text.
23Two clarifications. First, reasoning correctly does not guarantee that our attitudes are well
grounded or properly based. But nor does reasoning correctly guarantee that our attitudes are
correct: we might have started from falsehoods. There are complications about what exactly
it is for an attitude to be properly based—that is, correctly based on normative reasons. We
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Oughts from Validity does not speak to this aspect of reasoning at all. Suppose
I believe that P and believe that P → Q. Suppose also that my evidence for them is so
overwhelming that I ought not give either of them up. Then, given both the CL- and
R-validity of modus ponens, to satisfy Oughts from Validity I ought not disbelieve that
Q. In fact I come to believe that Q and so am as I ought to be: believing that Q is a way of
not disbelieving that Q.24 But notice that Oughts from Validity is completely silent
about how I satisfy it. I satisfy Oughts from Validity just as well whether I conclude
that Q by an application of modus ponens, or whether I come to believe it as a result of a
bump on the head.
I don’t mean this to be a decisive case against Oughts from Validity. But the
principle leaves out an important aspect of reasoning: basing our attitudes on one another.
So, to the extent that a logic ought to speak to reasoning, we should take seriously the
possibility that the logic has normative upshot not just for how an agent’s attitudes hang
together in the combinatorial sense, but for how they are based on one another. In §3.3, I’ll
suggest more promising basing principles than Oughts (Basing) from Validity. The
point to underscore here is that basing principles are a well motivated way of broadening our
conception of what it is for a logic to do genuine normative work.
One might object, however, that even if basing is an important aspect of reasoning, it’s
not the work of a deductive logic to provide a full theory of reasoning. Perhaps basing is the
can set them aside, but see Turri (2010) and Lord and Sylvan (2019). Second, and relatedly,
we should distinguish structural and substantive basing principles. The former concern only
how attitudes are based on other attitudes, while the latter concern how attitudes are based on
normative reasons—presumably evidence in the case of beliefs. Our focus here is on structural
basing principles. This is because it is not the business of (deductive) logic to weigh in on whether
beliefs are based on good evidence. Rather, logic’s normative upshot concerns how one’s attitudes
relate to one another, both in the traditional combinatorial sense and in the basing sense that I
am foregrounding. For more on structural and substantive principles in contexts other than logic,
see Scanlon (2007), Worsnip (2015), and Fogal (2019).
24This is compatible with the point made in n. 21, that believing α is not equivalent to not
disbelieving α. Believing that α is one way of not disbelieving α, but there are others, including:
suspending judgment about α, never having considered α.
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purview of a theory of justification or an inductive logic. Let me say two things by way of
reply. First, considering basing principles is compatible with demarcating deductive logics
from inductive logics on the grounds of necessitation.25 And we might think that there’s
an important aspect of reasoning concerned with basing for necessarily truth-preserving
inferences. Second, taking seriously the motivation of nonclassical logicians suggests that
it is precisely this aspect of reasoning that many of them are keen to capture with their
consequence relations. To see this, let us consider one final neglected dimension of the
normative landscape before revisiting the Collapse Objection.
3.2.3 Invalidity
Relevance logicians are often explicitly motivated to formulate a consequence relation that
captures a sense in which an argument’s goodness goes beyond mere truth preservation. In
addition, they claim, an argument’s goodness stems in part from the premises’ supporting
the conclusion. As Beall and Restall (2006, 55, original emphasis) put it, “the conclusion of a
relevantly invalid argument does not follow from the premises.” While the argument from P
to Q ∨ ¬Q preserves truth, it is deficient insofar as P provides no support for Q ∨ ¬Q. This
is reflected in the R-invalidity of the argument. This is important for two reasons. First,
it provides additional support for bringing basing principles into the discussion of logic’s
normative upshot. An important motivation for relevance logicians is that an arbitrary
premise cannot be a good basis for an arbitrary conclusion, even a logical truth: the premise
is irrelevant to the conclusion.26
25See Bueno and Shalkowski (2009) for a discussion of necessitation in the context of Beall and
Restall’s (2006) pluralism.
26The generalization of this part of the argument to logics other than R is not trivial. Analogous
arguments will have to be made on a logic-by-logic basis. I am cautiously optimistic about these
prospects. Consider how the reasoning might run for intuitionistic logic: intuitionistically invalid
arguments are deficient insofar as there is no demonstration of the conclusion from the premises.
The unavailability of a proof is what, according to the intuitionist, undermines the premises’
ability to be a good basis for the conclusion. The point deserves further consideration, but that
will have to be left to another occasion.
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Second, and independently of basing, the Beall-and-Restall intuition supports considering
what normative upshot a logic might have due to an argument’s invalidity. After all,
the intuition is that there is something problematic about the argument from P to Q ∨
¬Q—something that is reflected by its R-invalidity.
Here’s a candidate principle that makes a connection between the invalidity of an argument
and normativity:
Oughts from Invalidity. For any logic, K, if Γ 2K α, then S ought to be
such that she does not both: believe each γ ∈ Γ and believe α.
As it stands, this principle is not plausible. To take just one major problem, Oughts from
Invalidity precludes an agent from having any beliefs that are not logically entailed by her
other beliefs. Banned beliefs include those which are not entailed by one’s other beliefs, but
for which one has extremely strong non-deductive evidence.
Once again, however, the present concern is not the specific principle, but the broader
construal of what it might be for a logic to do genuine normative work. Relevance logicians
are motivated by the defectiveness of the argument from P to Q∨¬Q. This opens the door to
countenancing logic’s making a normative difference by way of invalidity, as well as validity.
When thinking generally about what it is for a logic to do genuine normative work, I’ve
suggested that we need to broaden our normative horizons. We should look beyond a principle
like to Oughts from Validity to consider three neglected dimensions of normative work:
reasons-related principles that allow for pro tanto normative work; basing principles that
involve normative objects other than combinations of attitudes; and invalidity principles that
allow for normative work when an argument is invalid.27
27To be clear, reasons-related principles have been discussed (by, for instance, Harman (1986) and
MacFarlane (2004)), but they have not been taken up in the collapse debate. As far as I am
aware, neither basing principles nor invalidity principles have been seriously considered either in
the context of collapse, or in the wider debate about logic and normativity. See Way (2011) and
Broome (2013, 140–141, 186–191) for discussions of basing principles in an ever broader context,
however.
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There is more to be said at this general level of normative exploration. But it is time for
us to return to the Collapse Objection.
3.3 The Collapse Objection Revisited
From this more inclusive perspective of what it might be for a logic to do genuine normative
work, consider two principles. They are promising candidates for the pluralist to appeal to in
securing genuine normative work for her weaker logic.
Reasons (Basing) from Validity. For any logic, K, if Γ K α, then S has a
reason to be such that: if S believes each γ ∈ Γ, then S bases a belief in α on
her beliefs in each γ ∈ Γ.
Reasons (Basing) from Invalidity. For any logic, K, if Γ 2K α, then S has
a reason against being such that she both: believes each γ ∈ Γ and bases a belief
in α on her beliefs in each γ ∈ Γ.
These principles differ from Oughts from Validity by changing both the normative notion
to a pro tanto one and the object of the normative notion to something that involves basing.
Reasons (Basing) from Invalidity also changes the condition for normative upshot to
the invalidity of an argument.
The principles have the same general motivations as considered in the last section.
Reasons are important in other normative disciplines (say, ethics and epistemology), and we
should also consider them in philosophy of logic. The move to reasons is also motivated by
particular cases, like the preface paradox. Bringing in basing is warranted by the background
assumption that a genuine logic has an important connection to reasoning and the fact that
reasoning involves how attitudes are based on one another, and not just whether they are
consistent. Finally, both the move to basing principles and the move to an invalidity principle
gain support from taking seriously a key motivation of relevance logicians: the defectiveness
of CL-valid but R-invalid arguments. This is naturally interpreted as a failure of the premises
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to provide an adequate basis for the conclusions of R-invalid arguments.28
Before seeing how these principles can help the pluralist avoid collapse, four clarifications
are in order.
First, the normative object of these principles involves basing a belief in the conclusion of
an argument on its premises. Theorists often focus on inference that results in forming a new
belief. While this is one way of basing a belief in the conclusion on the premises, inference
need not result in a new belief (Harman 1986). It can also involve basing a belief one already
has on a new foundation, as when I perform a piece of reasoning that supports a belief I
already held on different grounds.29 So, whether forming a new belief or basing an already
held belief in a different way, Reasons (Basing) from Validity and Reasons (Basing)
from Invalidity concern not just whether an agent’s attitudes are consistent, but how
they are based on one another.
Second, one might worry that Reasons (Basing) from Invalidity provides reasons
against performing extremely strong pieces of nondeductive reasoning. Consider inferring
that the sun will rise tomorrow on the basis of your beliefs about the past. The corresponding
formalized argument is both CL- and R-invalid. So, granting that both logics are correct, they
generate reasons against basing believing the conclusion on the premises. This is an acceptable
result of Reasons (Basing) from Invalidity. The weight of the reasons against basing
believing the conclusion on the premises is presumably outweighed by the inductive evidence
that the premises provide for the conclusion. Moreover, the argument’s CL- and R-invalidity
do indeed tell against basing believing the conclusion on the premises. Despite its inductive
28The interpretation of R-invalid arguments as not providing adequate bases also gains support from
the difficulties of specifying a notion of relevance that can do the duty that relevance logicians
require of it. See, for instance, Lewis’s (1988) criticism of “relevant implication.”
29Harman (1986) focuses on cases of giving up a belief in the following way: the agent takes a
conclusion that is entailed by some premises to be absurd, and hence gives up a belief in at least
one premise. But another kind of case of giving up a belief through reasoning is as follows: the
agent performs some reasoning and that convinces her that one of her currently held beliefs is not
adequately based on her other attitudes; thus she gives up the groundless belief.
70
strength, the inference is pro tanto deficient insofar as it is not deductively valid by the lights
of either logic.30
Third, one might worry that both principles generate more reasons for pluralists than
for monists. If an argument is valid or invalid according to both the logics that a pluralist
endorses, does this mean that she has an extra reason with respect to basing, a reason that
the monist lacks? No. The principles are not sensitive to which logics S endorses, if any.
Which logics generate reasons is determined by which logics are correct, not whether S is a
monist or a pluralist.
Fourth and finally, one might worry that Reasons (Basing) from Validity generates
reasons where there should be none. Consider that {α} CL,R α. But surely S does not
thereby have a reason either to base a belief in α on itself or to give up her belief in α. A
belief cannot be an adequate basis for itself.31 This is a blow to Reasons (Basing) from
Validity, but it can be mitigated. A deductive logic, we have already seen, is not in the
business of providing a full theory of reasoning or of inferential basing. Relevance logicians
try to capture a central aspect of deduction, one to which classical logic is not sensitive. But
R is a regimentation and an idealization. It will not get everything correct. As long as it
captures enough of a central enough aspect of reasoning, this is worth putting up with.32 I
will leave the reader to judge the effectiveness of this reply. For now, let us acknowledge the
30A similar worry arises when the pluralist’s logics disagree: {P} CL Q ∨ ¬Q but {P} 2R Q ∨ ¬Q.
Reasons (Basing) from Invalidity provides a reason against performing this piece of classically
valid reasoning. Two replies. First, this is feature rather than a bug, given the Beall-and-Restall
intuition: “the conclusion of a relevantly invalid argument does not from the premises” (2006, 55).
There really is something defective with that piece of reasoning: the premise is not an adequate
basis for the conclusion. Second, R and Reasons (Basing) from Invalidity provide no reason
against performing the distinct inference: P ; the argument from P to Q ∨ ¬Q is valid according
to a genuine logic; therefore, Q ∨ ¬Q. Suppose we formalize that as an argument from P and
P → (Q ∨ ¬Q) to Q ∨ ¬Q. That is an R-valid instance of modus ponens.
31Perhaps there are exceptions, such as the belief that one has at least one belief. But these will be
rare at best.
32Compare: ∃xx = x is a logical truth according to classical first-order logic. Many take this to be
an unfortunate artifact of the idealization that a logic must involve, rather than a fatal blow to
the logic, or a surprising discovery of a logical truth (but see Williamson 2017).
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potential cost and set it aside to return to the Collapse Objection.
There are choice points for pluralists here: do they accept both Reasons (Basing)
from Validity and Reasons (Basing) from Invalidity or just one of them? Do they
abandon Oughts from Validity or keep it alongside at least one of these new principles?
Because it is most favorable to the friend of collapse, I assume that the pluralist keeps
Oughts from Validity.33 Even so, adopting either Reasons (Basing) from Validity
or Reasons (Basing) from Invalidity provides a way of resisting collapse.
Recall the subargument that the friend of collapse adduces in favor of Only One Works.
(1.1) All-or-Nothing Normative Work. A logic does genuine normative work if
and only if it makes an all-or-nothing normative difference: a difference to what
an agent is entitled or obligated to do.
(1.2) Whether the pluralist’s logics agree or disagree, only the strongest logic makes
an all-or-nothing normative difference.
(2) Therefore, Only One Works. One and only one logic does genuine normative
work.
The pluralist concedes (1.2), but can contend that All-or-Nothing Normative Work is
too narrow. It excludes the normative labor done by reasons, via principles such as Reasons
(Basing) from Validity and Reasons (Basing) from Invalidity. Moreover, when
the premises are reformulated to accommodate this broader swath of normative space, the
subargument is no good.
33Another possibility is to adopt different principles for different logics, rather than having each
principle range over all the genuine logics. For instance, one might adopt something like Oughts
from CL-Validity: if Γ CL α, then S ought to be such that she does not both: believe each
γ ∈ Γ and disbelieve α. And Reasons (Basing) from R-Invalidity: if Γ 2R α, then S has a
reason against being such that she both: believes each γ ∈ Γ and bases a belief in α on her beliefs
in each γ ∈ Γ.
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(1.1*) Ecumenical Normative Work. A logic does genuine normative work if and
only if it makes an ecumenical normative difference: a difference to what an
agent is entitled to do, obligated to do, or has reason to do.
(1.2*) Whether the pluralist’s logics agree or disagree, only the strongest logic makes
an ecumenical normative difference.
(2) Therefore, Only One Works. One and only one logic does genuine normative
work.
The pluralist accepts this construal of genuine normative work, but contends that (1.2*) is
false. To see this, let’s revisit the cases of logical agreement and disagreement.
The logics agree. Consider an analogy. I promise to go to your party. I am, other things
equal, thereby obligated to go to your party. If it turns out that Beyoncé is going to be at
your party, that gives me a reason to go to your party that I didn’t have. But my promising
still suffices on its own to obligate me to go to the party; if Beyoncé cancels, I’m not thereby
off the hook for fulfilling my promise. So even though Beyoncé’s presence doesn’t change
the entitlements and obligations I am under with respect to party going, it still makes an
important difference to the normative situation.
As for Beyoncé, so for the pluralist’s weaker logic.34 If Γ R α, then Γ CL α. So the
pluralist is obligated not to believe each of the premises while disbelieving the conclusion.
Grant also that this obligation is due entirely to CL. Nonetheless, the R-validity of the
argument and Reasons (Basing) from Validity generate a reason to believe the conclusion
on the basis of the premise-beliefs (or to give up at at least one premise-belief). It’s true
that the CL-validity of the argument and Reasons (Basing) from Validity generate a
34There’s a point of disanalogy worth mentioning. In the case of the party, the obligation and the
reason have the same object: going to the party. When the pluralist’s logics agree, the obligation
and the reason have different objects, since the reason concerns basing rather than combinations
of attitudes. Similar remarks will apply when the logics disagree. These wrinkles can be set aside,
because doing so makes no difference when the logics agree, and favors the friend of collapse when
the logics disagree. See n. 37.
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similar reason, but this does not make R’s contribution superfluous. A reason to φ is not
rendered inert by an additional reason to φ.35 So, when the pluralist’s logics agree, even
the weaker logic makes a normative difference by contributing a reason that would not be
contributed were that logic incorrect.36
This is already enough to undermine (1.2*). Recall:
(1.2*) Whether the pluralist’s logics agree or disagree, only the strongest logic makes
an ecumenical normative difference.
So Reasons (Basing) from Validity is enough on its own to resist collapse when the
logics agree. Let’s set it to one side for the time being, and consider how Reasons (Basing)
from Invalidity allows the pluralist to resist collapse when the logics disagree.
The logics disagree. Consider another analogy. I promise to go to your party. I am, other
things equal, thereby obligated to go to your party. I win a ticket to a Beyoncé concert that
is at the same time as your party. That is a reason against going to your party, but, we can
stipulate, not sufficient reason to overturn the obligation to attend. Nonetheless, the reason
makes a normative difference. For instance, it licenses regret about not being able to attend
the concert when I dutifully attend your party.
Now, consider again: {P} CL Q∨¬Q but {P} 2R Q∨¬Q. By Oughts from Validity
and the CL-validity of the argument, the pluralist ought to be such that she does not both
believe that P and disbelieve that Q ∨ ¬Q. But Reasons (Basing) from Invalidity and
the R-invalidity of the argument gives the pluralist a reason against both believing that P
and basing a belief that Q ∨ ¬Q on her belief that P . The reason doesn’t undermine the
obligation, nor does it mean that she has to fulfill the obligation by giving up her belief that
35Perhaps there are cases where this fails to hold (Dancy 2004). But the case under discussion is
not one of them.
36Given Reasons (Basing) from Invalidity, this also holds when the logics agree on an
argument’s invalidity.
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P .37 Nonetheless, the reason makes a normative difference. For instance, it licenses criticism
for drawing the conclusion on the basis of the premise.38 This is exactly the kind of criticism
that a relevance logician might raise. The irrelevance of the premises to the conclusion of
a truth-preserving, but R-invalid, argument provides a reason not to base a belief in the
conclusion on the premises.
Let’s take stock. Reasons (Basing) from Validity allows the pluralist’s weaker logic
to make a normative difference when the logics agree. Reasons (Basing) from Invalidity
allows the weaker logic to make a normative difference when the logics disagree. Against
the backdrop of Ecumenical Normative Work, if either principle is correct, then the
Collapse Objection is undermined. Although they may need refining, the principles are not
ad hoc. They are instead independently motivated by the general importance of reasons to
normativity, by reasoning’s involving basing, and by specific considerations that support the
adoption of the pluralist’s weaker logic.
3.4 An Objection and a Reply
The discussion has revealed that the Collapse Objection’s efficacy depends on what it is for a
logic to do genuine normative work. Proponents (and opponents) of the Collapse Objection
have construed genuine normative work as requiring an all-or-nothing normative difference:
37There is the possibility of Reasons (Basing) from Invalidity making a difference to what the
pluralist ought to do, even holding fixed CL’s contribution that she ought not both believe that
P and disbelieve that Q ∨ ¬Q. Since Reasons (Basing) from Invalidity’s normative object
involves basing, it might tip the scales such that, in addition to not having the banned combination
of attitudes, the pluralist ought not, say, base a belief in Q∨¬Q on her belief that P . Or perhaps
the pluralist ought to be criticized for basing her belief in the way that she does. These would
be ways for R to do genuine normative work even by the strict standards of All-or-Nothing
Normative Work: a reasons-related principle can change what an agent ought to do if the
weight of the reason is strong, or if there are few other reasons for it to be balanced against. In
the main text, I argue that, even if the reasons-related principles never make an all-or-nothing
difference, this is still enough for the pluralist’s weaker logic to earn its normative keep.
38This is another route to the weaker logic making an all-or-nothing normative difference: the
weaker logic’s reason might tip the balance of reasons such that the agent ought to be criticized.
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All-or-Nothing Normative Work. A logic does genuine normative work if
and only if it makes an all-or-nothing normative difference: a difference to what
an agent is entitled or obligated to do.
I’ve argued that we should instead cast the net of normative significance wider, and include
the contribution a logic might make by way of pro tanto reasons:
Ecumenical Normative Work. A logic does genuine normative work if and
only if it makes an ecumenical normative difference: a difference to what an agent
is entitled to do, obligated to do, or has reason to do.
As we’ve seen, Ecumenical Normative Work combines with independently motivated
principles to allow the pluralist’s weaker logic to earn its normative keep.
The increase in dialectical clarity suggests a natural objection to my argument, however.
The objection pushes back on replacing All-or-Nothing Normative Work with Ec-
umenical Normative Work. If the only way for a logic to make a genuine normative
difference is by way of all-or-nothing entitlements or obligations, the Collapse Objection is
reinstated. The objector can even grant Reasons (Basing) from Validity and Reasons
(Basing) from Invalidity (or other reasons-related principles). That is, they can admit
that logics generate reasons while insisting that this is not genuine normative work. Making
only a pro tanto normative difference is not enough to distinguish a genuine logic from a
piece of mathematics.
If this is what friends of collapse have in mind, then they need to be clear that this is
what they are doing. They need to make the case that a pro tanto normative difference
does not suffice for genuine normative work. In the absence of such a case, given the general
importance of pro tanto reasons to other parts of the normative landscape, the pluralist is
warranted in sticking to Ecumenical Normative Work. So there is a dialectical burden
that needs to be discharged to make good on the objection to Ecumenical Normative
Work.
One might think that this burden can be met by drawing on the extant collapse literature.
Read (2006, 195) motivates the Collapse Objection by appealing to the idea that “the central
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question of logic” is whether the conclusion of a given argument is true (given that the
premises are true).39 Take a case where CL and R disagree: Γ CL α but Γ 2R α. CL
answers the central question. It tells us that that α is true, given Γ. R is silent; it does not
answer the central question. Given this, we should defer to CL, which normatively “trumps”
R (Read 2006, 195). And, we might extend Read’s argument, CL’s normative dominance
with respect to R persists through any pro tanto contribution of R’s. This is because those
contributions are irrelevant to the central question.
While this line of thought is suggestive, there’s a problem with the appeal to the central
question of logic. It is far from clear either that logic has a single central question, or if so,
that the question is whether the conclusion of a given argument is true. For instance, Priest
(2006, 196), a friend of the Collapse Objection, argues that logic is centrally bound up with
the analysis of reasoning. He adds:
[t]he central purpose of an analysis of reasoning is to determine what follows from
what—what premises support what conclusions—and why.
But the question of what premises support what conclusions is not the same as the question
of what conclusions are true given what premises. This is because the notion of support
must be richer than mere truth preservation. As I argued in §3.2, good reasoning should
allow premises to support a conclusion in the sense of being proper bases for it, rather than
just having the premises guarantee the truth of the conclusion. This is just the kind of
consideration that relevance logicians seek to capture with consequence relations like R. It
motivates the clear and intuitive complaint against an argument from an arbitrary set of
sentences to an arbitrary CL-logical-truth. The premises do not support the conclusion: the
premises are not relevant to the conclusion, and so cannot be an adequate basis for it.
Hence no argument for All-or-Nothing Normative Work falls out from an appeal
to the putative central question of logic. Even if logic has one such question, it’s more
39Read attributes the question to Priest (2001). See also Keefe (2014, 1385).
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plausibly bound up with reasoning than with what is true given some premises. Reasoning
goes beyond mere truth preservation and so opens the door for the principles that I’ve
outlined here.40
This reply is not decisive. It leaves open the possibility of the friend of collapse making a
stronger case for All-or-Nothing Normative Work. Even if such a case is forthcoming,
however, we have made progress by refocusing the collapse debate on the crucial, but neglected,
question of what it takes for a logic to do genuine normative work. Moreover, answers to
that question will have to go beyond Oughts from Validity and consider a richer range
of possibilities for normative labor.
Conclusion
The Collapse Objection charges the logical pluralist with being an unwitting monist. All
logics do genuine normative work, but only the pluralist’s strictly strongest logic does genuine
normative work. So pluralism collapses into monism. Both proponents and opponents of
collapse have assumed an overly narrow conception of what it is for a logic to do genuine
normative work. Independently of the Collapse Objection, we should broaden our normative
horizons by considering three neglected dimensions of normative work: reasons-related
principles, basing principles, and invalidity principles. These dimensions are supported by:
the general importance of reasons to normativity, the fact that reasoning involves basing and
not just consistency, and the intuitive defectiveness with R-invalid arguments that motivates
relevance logicians. Against the backdrop of this more ecumenical normative landscape, I
highlighted two promising principles for the pluralist. If either Reasons (Basing) from
Validity or Reasons (Basing) from Invalidity is correct, then the pluralist’s weaker
40Admittedly, the door is most directly opened to basing principles, whether those are couched in
terms of reasons or not. The main point, however, is that the appeal to a central question of
logic doesn’t by itself discharge the burden of explaining why pro tanto differences cannot count
as genuine normative work, given the general importance of reasons throughout the normative
landscape.
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logics can earn their keep by doing genuine, albeit pro tanto, normative work. Rather than
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